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ABSTRACT
We develop a model of optimal consumption, labor and portfolio choice with
endogenous retirement for an individual's life-cycle decisions. Explicit solutions
for nite horizon are derived both for an individual with power utility and for an
individual with log utility. There are two distinct phases in the life-cycle, the rst
being accumulation phase and the second being retirement phase. The individual
simultaneously chooses consumption, labor, portfolio and whether to retire so as to
maximize the expected utility. We show that the dynamic budget constraint can be
reduced to a static budget constraint. For this static optimization problem involving
both stochastic optimal control and optimal stopping, we use the convex duality
approach to transform it to a pure optimal stopping problem. The value function can
be characterized using early exercise premium representation which depends on the
optimal retirement boundary. We show that immediate retirement is optimal when
a state variable hits the boundary. We derive the backward recursive equation of the
boundary parameterized by a multiplier which itself satises a nonlinear equation
from the static budget constraint. The optimal wealth and the optimal portfolio
are derived and they depend on the retirement boundary and the derivative of this
v
boundary with respect to the multiplier. A numerical algorithm is developed for
computation of the solutions. We analyze the properties and the structures of the
optimal policies and also prove that retirement is optimal when the nancial wealth
crosses its boundary of which we derive an explicit form.
We study next a model of optimal dividend-contribution, portfolio and liqui-
dation from the viewpoint of a dened benet pension fund. The sponsor faces a
stream of intermediate liability and a terminal liability. The optimization problem
stops at the optimal liquidation date rather than continues for the second phase.
Preference of the sponsor is dened over net cash ow (dividends or contributions)
depending on whether outlay from the fund is higher than or lower than the liability.
We analyze the behavior of the optimal policies and identify in the optimal portfo-
lio the hedges against uctuations in the intermediate liability and in the terminal
liability.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
We study the dynamic optimal asset allocation problem from both an individuals and a
pension funds point of view. For an individual, who faces the tradeo¤s of consumption-
saving, labor-leisure, risk-reward and working-retirement, we examine the optimal life-
cycle policies. For a dened benet pension fund, of which the asset-liability man-
agement involves the choices of dividend-contribution, risk-reward and continuation-
liquidation, we investigate the behavior of the optimal decisions.
The scientic literature for the portfolio choice problem begins with one-period mean-
variance optimization, notably in Markowitz (1952, 1959). Samuelson (1969) analyzes
discrete time multi-period model. Merton (1969, 1971) rst develops continuous time
di¤usion process model, and provides the fundamental insight that optimal portfolio
includes intertemporal hedging against uctuations in investment opportunity set. Cox
and Huang (1989, 1991), Karatzas et al. (1987) and Pliska (1986) propose the martingale
method, and this technique establishes the correspondence between a dynamic optimiza-
tion problem and a static problem. Ocone and Karatzas (1991) derive representation
formula for the optimal portfolio. Detemple et al. (2003) develop a simulation-based
approach for calculating the optimal portfolio.
Bodie et al. (1992, 2004, 2009, 2012) are critical extensions for individualsoptimal
life-cycle decision problem, by incorporating essential elements such as exible labor,
habit formation and retirement phase. We extend along these lines to study a model
of optimal consumption, labor and portfolio choice with endogenous retirement for an
2individuals life-cycle decisions. There are two distinct phases in the life-cycle, the rst
being accumulation phase and the second being retirement phase. At each point in
time, the individual simultaneously chooses consumption, labor, portfolio and whether
to retire so as to maximize the expected utility. We derive closed form solutions of
all optimal policies involved and provide numerical implementation of our model, for
an individual with power utility in Chapter 2 and for an individual with log utility in
Chapter 3.
Existing literature on optimal retirement decision examines the case of innite hori-
zon where the individual is innitely lived, such as Choi and Shim (2006), Farhi and
Panageas (2007), Choi et al. (2008), Lim and Shin (2011). When the individual ex-
amined has a deadline for retirement, such as in Farhi and Panageas (2007), only ap-
proximate optimal policies are provided. Our rst contribution is to derive closed-form
solutions of the optimal policies for nite horizon case. Our model is especially suit-
able to capture the feature of reality that there is a retirement phase with a terminal
date in life-cycle and it has the advantage that the retirement boundary derived is time
dependent, whereas the boundary derived from the innite horizon case has no time
dimension. Our approach of decomposing the value function by early exercise premium
representation a¤ords interesting interpretations in terms of net local gains from early
retirement or delayed retirement. We show that immediate retirement is optimal when
an endogenous state variable, related to the wage and the state price density, hits the
boundary. We provide e¢ cient numerical implementation to compute the boundary and
the optimal policies. It is notable that this optimal retirement boundary depends on time
and an initial Lagrange multiplier, but does not depend on the underlying Brownian mo-
tion. We show that a transformation of this boundary gives us the retirement boundary
for the liquid wealth. This boundary is more practical and useful because an individual
can compare his observed liquid wealth with this boundary and know if its optimal to
3retire immediately. Interestingly, we show that the closed form representations of the
optimal wealth and the optimal portfolio not only depend on the retirement boundary,
but also depend on the derivative of the boundary with respect to the multiplier. The
components in the representation of the wealth processes that depend on the derivative,
are precisely the discrepancy between an early exercise premium representation of the
wealth processes and their true value. We also examine the e¤ects of retirement option
to the optimal consumption, the optimal leisure and the total expenditure. We show
that the e¤ects can be examined by comparing the initial wealth of an individual who
has the retirement option with the initial wealth of an individual who does not have the
retirement option. We also investigate the relationship between the optimal policies of
an individual with log utility and the corresponding optimal policies of an individual
with power utility. We identify the conditions under which the optimal policies of an
individual with log utility are the limits of the optimal policies of an individual with
power utility as the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion converges to 1.
In Chapter 4, we study a model of optimal dividend-contribution, portfolio and
liquidation from the viewpoint of a dened benet pension fund. Relatively limited
attendation has been devoted to applying the theory of dynamic optimal asset alloca-
tion to study asset-liability management, in spite of the large amount of dened benet
pension asset accumulated over the years currently under management. Boulier et al.
(1995), Cairns (2000), Rudolf and Ziemba (2004), Detemple and Rindisbacher (2008),
Detemple et al. (2010) and Van Binsbergen and Brandt (2012) are examples of recent
contributions in the asset-liability management for dened benet pension fund liter-
ature. Our work extends Detemple et al. (2010) to incorporate endogenous optimal
liquidation in the asset-liability management model.
For a dened benet pension fund, its asset-liability management involves the choices
of dividend-contribution, risk-reward and continuation-liquidation. The crucial di¤er-
4ence between the asset allocation problem for a pension fund and the problem for an
individuals life-cycle is that the pension fund faces a stream of intermediate liability and
a terminal liability, which are benet payments to the pension plan participants. The
value and the risk of this liability side of the balance sheet of a pension fund, are crucial
for its optimal asset allocation of pension asset. In other words, the whole balance sheet
of the pension fund should be taken into consideration for optimal policies. An asset
allocation strategy focusing exclusively on the pension asset while neglecting either the
intermediate liability or the terminal liability, is bound to be suboptimal.
The two problems share similarities. The optimal liquidation date, or the optimal
date to switch from a dened benet pension plan to a dened contribution pension
plan, is modeled as an optimal stopping time chosen by the fund sponsor, similar to the
optimal retirement date of an individuals life-cycle. However, the liquidation date of
the pension fund is the terminal date of the investment horizon, and the sponsor cares
about the lump sum amount of dividend or contribution at this date. The optimization
problem stops at the liquidation date and does not continue to a second phase as in an
individuals life-cycle decisions.
We derive the recursive integral equation of the optimal liquidation boundary for
an endogenous variable, which is related to the terminal liability and the state price
density. We provide closed-form solutions of the optimal net cash ow (dividends or
contributions), the optimal liquid wealth and the optimal portfolio. As in the indi-
viduals life-cycle problem, early exercise premium representation a¤ords interesting
interpretations in terms of net local gains from early liquidation or delayed liquidation.
Optimal net cash ows are shown to be positive (dividends) when state price density is
su¢ ciently low and be negative (contributions) when state price density is su¢ ciently
high. We also derive the liquidation boundary for the pension assets and identify in the
optimal portfolio the hedges against uctuations in the intermediate liability and in the
5terminal liability.
The mathematical tools used are those of convex duality theory and optimal stopping
theory. We reduce the dynamic budget constraint to a static budget constraint. For
this static optimization problem involving both stochastic optimal control and optimal
stopping, we use the convex duality approach to transform it to a pure optimal stopping
problem in which we can treat the multiplier as a constant. The value function can be
characterized using early exercise premium representation which depends on the optimal
exercise boundary. The EEP representation corresponds to the Riesz decomposition of
the Snell Envelope, which is the smallest supermartingale majorant of the underlying
stochastic process. It gives a decomposition of the Snell Envelope to the sum of a
martingale and a potential and this potential corresponds to the early exercise premium.
By the fact that the Snell Envelope is equal to the underlying process when the state
variable is within the exercise region, we derive the backward recursive equation of the
boundary parameterized by the multiplier which itself satises a nonlinear equation
from the static budget constraint. An e¢ cient numerical algorithm is developed for
computation of the boundary and the optimal policies.
Part I
Optimal consumption, labor,
portfolio and retirement
6
7Chapter 2
Optimal consumption, labor, portfolio and
retirement for individuals with power
utility
2.1 Introduction
We develop a model of optimal consumption, labor and portfolio choice with endoge-
nous retirement for an individuals life-cycle decisions. There are two distinct phases
in the life-cycle, the rst being accumulation phase and the second being retirement
phase. At each point in time before retirement, the individual simultaneously chooses
consumption, labor, portfolio and whether to retire so as to maximize the expected util-
ity. After retirement, the individual chooses only consumption and portfolio as labor
supply becomes zero.
Existing literature on optimal retirement decision examines the case of innite hori-
zon where the individual is innitely lived. When the individual examined has a deadline
for retirement, only approximate optimal policies are provided. Our rst contribution
is to derive closed-form solutions of the optimal policies for nite horizon case. Our
model is especially suitable to capture the feature of reality that there is a retirement
phase with a terminal date in life-cycle and it has the advantage that the retirement
boundary derived is time dependent, whereas the boundary derived from the innite
horizon case has no time dimension. Our approach of decomposing the value function
by early exercise premium representation a¤ords interesting interpretations in terms of
8net local gains from early retirement or delayed retirement. We show that immediate re-
tirement is optimal when an endogenous state variable, related to the wage and the state
price density, hits the boundary. We provide e¢ cient numerical implementation to com-
pute the boundary and the optimal policies. It is notable that this optimal retirement
boundary depends on time and an initial Lagrange multiplier, but does not depend on
the underlying Brownian motion. We show that a transformation of this boundary gives
us the retirement boundary for the liquid wealth. This boundary is more practical and
useful because an individual can compare his observed liquid wealth with this boundary
and know if its optimal to retire immediately. Interestingly, we show that the closed
form representations of the optimal wealth and the optimal portfolio not only depend
on the retirement boundary, but also depend on the derivative of the boundary with
respect to the multiplier. The components in the representation of the wealth processes
that depend on the derivative, are precisely the discrepancy between an early exercise
premium representation of the wealth processes and their true value. We also examine
the e¤ects of retirement option to the optimal consumption, the optimal leisure and the
total expenditure. We show that the e¤ects can be examined by comparing the initial
wealth of an individual who has the retirement option with the initial wealth of an in-
dividual who does not have the retirement option. We also investigate the relationship
between the optimal policies of an individual with log utility and the corresponding
optimal policies of an individual with power utility. We identify the conditions under
which the optimal policies of an individual with log utility are the limits of the optimal
policies of an individual with power utility as the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion
converges to 1.
The procedure to derive the solutions is as follows. We reduce the dynamic budget
constraint to a static budget constraint. For this static optimization problem involving
both stochastic optimal control and optimal stopping, we use the convex duality ap-
9proach to transform it to a pure optimal stopping problem in which we can treat the
multiplier as a constant. The value function can be characterized using early exercise
premium representation which depends on the optimal retirement boundary. We de-
rive the backward recursive equation of the boundary parameterized by the multiplier
which itself satises a nonlinear equation from the static budget constraint. A numer-
ical algorithm is developed for computation of the retirement boundary, the optimal
consumption, labor, wealth and portfolio. We analyze the properties and the structures
of the optimal policies.
The scientic literature for the portfolio choice problem begins with one-period mean-
variance optimization, notably in Markowitz (1952, 1959). Samuelson (1969) analyzes
discrete time multi-period model. Merton (1969, 1971) rst develops continuous time
di¤usion process model, and provides the fundamental insight that optimal portfolio
includes intertemporal hedging against uctuations in investment opportunity set. Cox
and Huang (1989, 1991), Karatzas et al. (1987) and Pliska (1986) propose the martingale
method, and this technique establishes the correspondence between a dynamic optimiza-
tion problem and a static problem. Ocone and Karatzas (1991) derive representation
formula for the optimal portfolio. Detemple et al. (2003) develop a simulation-based
approach for calculating the optimal portfolio.
Bodie et al. (1992) provide critical extensions where they study the e¤ect of labor
exibility on consumption and portfolio choice and nd that human capital is crucial
to explaining optimal behavior. Basak (1999) analyzes the e¤ect of human capital in
a general equilibrium model. Bodie et al. (2004) examine consumption and portfolio
choice with habit formation and they consider the e¤ect of retirement by incorporating
two distinct phases, the accumulation phase and the retirement phase. Bodie et al.
(2009) review recent literature on theoretical life-cycle models and related empirical
literature and they discuss the implications of the life-cycle models for design of pension
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plans. Bodie et al. (2012) study the property of the optimal pension contract that
nances consumption during the retirement phase. Our model extends along the lines
of Bodie et al. (1992, 2004, 2009, 2012) to consider endogenous retirement decision.
A number of papers examine optimal policies with endogenous retirement. Karatzas
and Wang (2000) rst develop the convex duality approach to study the problem with
mixed optimal control and optimal stopping. We extend the result to the case with two
distinct phases in life-cycle where consumption and investment continue after retirement
to a xed terminal date and with endogenous labor before retirement for individuals with
constant relative risk aversion. Sundaresan and Zapatero (1997) examine the e¤ect of
pension plan on the retirement incentives. Liu and Neis (2004) study the interaction of
optimal portfolio and optimal retirement, without a structural retirement phase. Dyb-
vig and Liu (2010) examine the e¤ect of retirement exibility and borrowing constraint
on life-cycle policies, but do not consider a deadline for retirement. A number of pa-
pers study optimal retirement close to the model in Bodie et al (1992), for the case of
innite horizon where the individual is innitely lived, such as Choi and Shim (2006),
Farhi and Panageas (2007), Choi et al. (2008) and Lim and Shin (2011). Choi and
Shim (2006) derive optimal policies for an individual who su¤ers a utility loss from
labor using dynamic programming approach. Lim and Shin (2011) study the e¤ect of
borrowing constraints, also for an individual who su¤ers utility loss from labor. In Choi
et al. (2008), preference of the individual examined is dened by a constant elasticity of
substitution utility function. A limitation for the innite horizon case in these papers
is that the retirement boundaries derived have no time dimension. Our approach using
early exercise premium representation is especially suitable for the nite horizon case
and retirement boundaries we derived are time dependent. Farhi and Panageas (2007)
study optimal retirement for an innitely lived individual, both when the retirement
date has a deadline and when it does not. When the individual examined has a dead-
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line for retirement in Farhi and Panageas (2007), only approximate optimal policies are
derived using ideas proposed by Barone-Adesi and Whaley (1987) to approximate a
partial di¤erential equation by an ordinary di¤erential equation. We derive closed-form
solutions which are exact expressions of the retirement boundary for the nite horizon
case using early exercise premium representation of the value function, both for an indi-
vidual with power utility and for an individual with log utility. Early exercise premium
(EEP) representation was introduced by Kim (1990), Jacka (1991), Carr et al. (1992)
for pricing American options and generalized by Rutkowski (1994) to semimartingale
payo¤s. The EEP representation corresponds to the Riesz decomposition of the Snell
Envelope to the sum of a martingale and a potential, and this potential corresponds to
the early exercise premium.
2.2 The model
(
;F ; P ) is a complete probability space. Wt, t 2 [0; T ] is a Brownian motion on the
probability space. The ow of information Ft, t 2 [0; T ] is the ltration generated by
Wt.
The market consists of a riskless asset and a risky asset. Riskless asset is a money
market account with a constant interest rate r > 0. Risky asset has instantaneous
return dRt which satises dRt = dt+ dWt.  is the expected rate of return,  is the
volatility of the return.  and  are both constants and positive. The market price of
risk is  = (  r) =. The state price density process is t = exp
  rt  1
2
2t  Wt

.
This structure implies that the Brownian motion risk is hedgeable, thus the market is
complete and there are no arbitrage opportunities.
There are two distinct phases in the individuals life-cycle, the rst being accu-
mulation phase and the second being retirement phase. At each point in time before
retirement, the individual has liquid wealth or nancial wealth Xt, and determines the
12
consumption ct, the leisure lt, and the dollar amount t invested in the risky asset. Con-
sumption process ct and leisure process lt are nonnegative, progressively measurable,
and they satisfy
R T
0
ctdt < 1 a.s. and
R T
0
ltdt < 1 a.s., where time 0 is the beginning
of working life and time T is terminal date of life. Portfolio process t is progressively
measurable and satises
R T
0
2tdt < 1 a.s. The individual is endowed with a maximal
amount of labor h. ht = h  lt is amount of labor supplied by the individual for which
the individual earns wages wt. We normalize the maximal work capacity h to be 1. The
wage process wt is stochastic and satises dwt = wt (wdt+ wdWt), where w is the
expected growth rate and w is the volatility of the growth rate. w and w are both
constants. The liquid wealth Xt satises
dXt = (Xt   t) rdt  ctdt+ wthtdt+ tdRt (2.1)
= (rXt   ct + wt   wtlt) dt+ t (dt+ dWt) ;
starting from X0 = x. After retirement, lt = 1 and the liquid wealth Xt satises
dXt = (Xt   t) rdt  ctdt+ tdRt
= (rXt   ct) dv + t (dt+ dWt) :
Preference ordering for the individual is represented by von Neumann-Morgenstein
expected utility
U = E
24 Z
0
avu
a (cv; lv) dv + 
TZ

avu
r (cv; 1) dv
35 ;
where ua (cv; lv) =
(cv l1 v )
1 R
(1 R) , u
r (cv; 1) =
c1 Rv
1 R and av = exp ( v). Intermediate
utility during accumulation phase ua (cv; lv) is Cobb-Douglas utility of consumption and
leisure, and intermediate utility ur (cv; 1) during retirement phase is power utility of
13
consumption.  is a measure of relative weight of consumption and leisure. R is the
coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion.  is the subjective discount rate.  is a coe¢ cient
that measures the relative weight of the retirement phase.  is the retirement date
chosen by the individual.  2 S, where S is the collection of stopping times with values
in [0; T ].
2.3 Convex duality and pure optimal stopping problem
We rst reduce the dynamic budget constraint (2:1) to a static budget constraint.
The policy of consumption, labor and portfolio choice (c; l; ) is said to be admissible:
(c; l; ) 2 A, if the no-bankruptcy condition is satised, i.e., the total wealth is nonneg-
ative. Before retirement, the total wealth Nt is the sum of the liquid wealth Xt and
the human capital Ht, where the human capital Ht is the present value of the maximal
earnings during the accumulation phase Et
R 
t
t;vwvdv

. Thus (c; l; ) is admissible if
Xt + Et
R 
t
t;vwvdv
  0. After retirement, the human capital is exhausted and the
total wealth is equal to the liquid wealth, thus (c; l; ) is admissible if Xt  0.
Static budget constraint is
E
24 Z
0
v (cv + wvlv) dv +
TZ

vcvdv
35  x+ E
24 Z
0
vwvdv
35 : (2.2)
It states that initial total wealth (the sum of initial liquid wealth x and initial human
capital E
R 
0
vwvdv

) is su¢ ciently large to nance consumption and leisure during
accumulation phase, and consumption during retirement phase.
Lemma 1. If (c; l; ) is admissible, then (c; l) satises the static budget constraint
(2:2). If (c; l) satises the static budget constraint (2:2), then 9 , such that (c; l; ) is
admissible.
Proof. See appendix. 
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The lemma shows that the optimization problem can be reduced to optimizing the
expected utility subject to the static budget constraint (2:2). The maximization problem
for the individual is
V (x) = sup
2S; (c;l;)2A
E
24 Z
0
avu
a (cv; lv) dv + 
TZ

avu
r (cv; 1) dv
35 (2.3)
subject to
E
24 Z
0
v (cv + lvwv) dv
35  E
24 Z
0
vwvdv
35+ E
24 TZ

vcvdv
35  x:
Next we transform the combined stochastic optimal control and optimal stopping
problem (2:3) to a pure optimal stopping problem. We rst introduce the Legendre-
Fenchel transform of utility function.
Utility function U : (0;1) ! R is strictly increasing, strictly concave and continu-
ously di¤erentiable. The inverse of U 0() is denoted as I(). Legendre-Fenchel transform
of utility function U(x0) is dened as
eU(y0) , max
x0>0
[U(x0)  x0y0] = U(I(y0))  y0I(y0); 0 < y0 <1:
Its derivative eU 0(y0) =  I(y0).  I(y0) is negative and increasing, therefore the functioneU() is strictly decreasing and strictly convex. We have
U(x0)  eU(y0) + x0y0, for 0 < x0 <1, 0 < y0 <1. (2.4)
For wo variables, dene
eU(y1; y2) , max
x1>0, x2>0
[U(x1; x2)  x1y1   x2y2] , 0 < y1 <1, 0 < y2 <1.
The maximum is attained when the rst order conditions are satised, i.e., Ux1(x1; x2) =
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y1, and Ux2(x1; x2) = y2. We have
U(x1; x2)  eU(y1; y2) + x1y1 + x2y2, (2.5)
for 0 < x1 <1, 0 < x2 <1, 0 < y1 <1, 0 < y2 <1.
Choose x0 = cv, y0 = ya 1v v and U(x0) = u
r (cv; 1) in (2:4), we have
ur (cv; 1)  eU r(ya 1v v) + ya 1v vcv;
or
avu
r (cv; 1)  av eU r(ya 1v v) + yvcv:
Choose x1 = cv, x2 = lv, y1 = ya 1v v, y2 = ya
 1
v vwv and U(x1; x2) = u
a (cv; lv) in (2:5),
we have
ua (cv; lv)  eUa(ya 1v v; ya 1v vwv) + ya 1v vcv + ya 1v vwvlv;
or
avu
a (cv; lv)  av eUa(ya 1v v; ya 1v vwv) + yvcv + yvwvlv:
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Therefore,
E
24 Z
0
avu
a (cv; lv) dv + 
TZ

avu
r (cv; 1) dv
35
 E
24 Z
0
av eUa(ya 1v v; ya 1v vwv)dv + TZ

av eU r(ya 1v v)dv
35
+yE
24 Z
0
(vcv + vwvlv) dv +
TZ

vcvdv
35
= E
24 Z
0
av eUa(ya 1v v; ya 1v vwv)dv + y Z
0
vwvdv +
TZ

av eU r(ya 1v v)dv
35
+yE
24 Z
0
(vcv + vwvlv) dv  
Z
0
vwvdv +
TZ

vcvdv
35
 E
24 Z
0
av eUa(ya 1v v; ya 1v vwv)dv + y Z
0
vwvdv +
TZ

av eU r(ya 1v v)dv
35
+yx:
Dene
eJ (y; )
, E
24 Z
0
av eUa(ya 1v v; ya 1v vwv)dv + y Z
0
vwvdv +
TZ

av eU r(ya 1v v)dv
35 :
Thus we have
E
24 Z
0
avu
a (cv; lv) dv + 
TZ

avu
r (cv; 1) dv
35  inf
y>0
h eJ (y; ) + yxi ;
and
V (x)  sup
2S
inf
y>0
h eJ (y; ) + yxi :
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Dene
eV (y)
, sup
2S
eJ (y; )
= sup
2S
E
24 Z
0
av eUa(ya 1v v; ya 1v vwv)dv + y Z
0
vwvdv +
TZ

av eU r(ya 1v v)dv
35 ;
and denote the stopping time that attains the supremum by  y, i.e., eV (y) = eJ  y;  y.
Therefore, we have
V (x)  sup
2S
inf
y>0
h eJ (y; ) + yxi  inf
y>0

sup
2S
eJ (y; ) + yx = inf
y>0
heV (y) + yxi : (2.6)
The next proposition extends the convex duality approach proposed by Karatzas and
Wang (2000) to two distinct phases where consumption and investment continue after
retirement to a xed terminal date with endogenous labor before retirement for power
utility. It shows that the inequality in (2:6) is indeed an equality, thus we can rst solve
the pure optimal stopping problem of eV (y), while treating the multiplier y as a constant.
Proposition 2.
V (x) = inf
y>0
heV (y) + yxi :
Proof. Before retirement, avua (cv; lv) = av
(cv l1 v )
1 R
(1 R) . First order conditions are
avu
a
c (cv; lv) = yv, avu
a
l (cv; lv) = yvwv. Thus,
avu
a
c (cv; lv) = av
 
cvl
1 
v
 R
c 1v l
1 
v = yv; (2.7)
avu
a
l (cv; lv) = av
 
cvl
1 
v
 R 1  

cvl
 
v = yvwv: (2.8)
(2:8) divided (2:7), we get 1 

cv
lv
= wv. Thus ev  cv + lvwv = cv . For (2:7), both
sides multiply by cv, we get av (cvl
1 
v )
1 R
= yvcv. Thus avu
a (cv; lv) = av
(cv l1 v )
1 R
(1 R) =
18
yvcv
(1 R) =
yvev
1 R . Calculation gives the following solutions which solve (2:7) and (2:8),
cv = 

yv
av
  1
R
w(1 )v f;
lv = (1  )

yv
av
  1
R
w(1 )v f
1
wv
;
ev =
cv

=

yv
av
  1
R
w(1 )v f;
where  = 1  1
R
and f = 1


1 

 (1 )
. During retirement, avur (cv; 1) = av c
1 R
v
1 R . First
order condition is avurc (cv; 1) = yv. Thus
avu
r
c (cv; 1) = avc
 R
v = yv:
Both sides multiply by cv gives avc1 Rv = yvcv, thus avu
r (cv; 1) = av
c1 Rv
1 R =
yvcv
1 R .
Calculation gives the following solution
cv =

yv
av
  1
R

1
R :
Now we have
av eUa(ya 1v v; ya 1v vwv) = avua (cv; lv)  yvcv   yvwvlv
=
R
 (1 R)yvc

v
=
R
1 Rfa
1
R
v (yv)
w(1 )v :
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av eUa(ya 1v v; ya 1v vwv) is a convex function of y. During retirement,
av eU r(ya 1v v) = avur (cv; 1)  yvcv
=
R
1 Ryvc

v
=
R
1 R
1
Ra
1
R
v (yv)
 :
av eU r(ya 1v v) is a convex function of y. Now we have
eJ (y; )
= E
24 Z
0
av eUa(ya 1v v; ya 1v vwv)dv + y Z
0
vwvdv +
TZ

av eU r(ya 1v v)dv
35
= E
24 Z
0
R
1 Rfa
1
R
v (yv)
w(1 )v dv + y
Z
0
vwvdv
+
TZ

R
1 R
1
Ra
1
R
v (yv)
 dv
35 :
eJ (y; ), as the sum of the three parts above, is also a convex function of y. For 0 <
y1 < y2, 0 < s < 1, y0 , sy1 + (1  s) y2,
eV (y0) = eJ  y0;  y0  s eJ  y1;  y0+ (1  s) eJ  y2;  y0  seV (y1) + (1  s) eV (y2):
Therefore eV (y) is convex. For any given  2 S and a given y, dene
x (y) , E
24 Z
0
(vc

v + vwvl

v) dv  
Z
0
vwvdv +
TZ

vc

vdv
35 :
For power utility functions, we have
x (y) = E
24 Z
0
fy 
1
Ra
1
R
v 

vw
(1 )
v dv  
Z
0
vwvdv +
TZ


1
R y 
1
Ra
1
R
v 

vdv
35 :
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Now because R
1 Ry
1  1
R is a convex function of y, we have
R
1 Ry
1  1
R
2  
R
1 Ry
1  1
R
1  (y2   y1)
d

R
1 Ry
1  1
R
1

dy1
=   (y2   y1) y 
1
R
1 :
Thus,
eV (y2)  eV (y1)
= eV (y2)  eJ  y1;  y1
 eJ  y2;  y1  eJ  y1;  y1
= E
264
y1Z
0
R
1 Rfa
1
R
v (y2v)
w(1 )v dv + y2
y1Z
0
vwvdv
+
TZ
y1
R
1 R
1
Ra
1
R
v (y2v)
 dv
375
 E
264
y1Z
0
R
1 Rfa
1
R
v (y1v)
w(1 )v dv + y1
y1Z
0
vwvdv
+
TZ
y1
R
1 R
1
Ra
1
R
v (y1v)
 dv
375
   (y2   y1)E
264
y1Z
0
fy
  1
R
1 a
1
R
v 

vw
(1 )
v dv  
y1Z
0
vwvdv
+
TZ
y1

1
R y
  1
R
1 a
1
R
v 

vdv
375
=   (y2   y1)xy1 (y1) :
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Let y2 approaches y1, we get
lim
y2"y1
eV (y2)  eV (y1)
y2   y1   x

y1
(y1)  lim
y2#y1
eV (y2)  eV (y1)
y2   y1 :
Thus eV 0(y) =  xy (y). For initial wealth x, suppose that we have x = xy (y) for some
y. Because eV (y) is convex and at y, eV 0(y) =  x, we have eV (y)  eV (y)  ( x) (y   y),
or eV (y) + yx  eV (y) + yx, for any y. Therefore, it shows that if we solve the optimal
stopping problem of eV (y), we obtain
V (x)
= sup
2S; (c;l;)2A
E
24 Z
0
avu
a (cv; lv) dv + 
TZ

avu
r (cv; 1) dv
35
 E
264
yZ
0
avu
a (cv (y) ; l

v (y)) dv + 
TZ
y
avu
r (cv (y) ; 1) dv
375
= E
264
yZ
0
R
1 Rfa
1
R
v (yv)
w(1 )v dv + y
yZ
0
vwvdv
+
TZ
y
R
1 R
1
Ra
1
R
v (yv)
 dv
375+ yx
= eV (y) + yx
= inf
y>0
heV (y) + yxi ;
i.e., V (x)  inf
y>0
heV (y) + yxi. We also know that V (x)  inf
y>0
heV (y) + yxi, therefore
V (x) = inf
y>0
heV (y) + yxi : 
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2.4 Early exercise premium representation and optimal retire-
ment boundary
Now the problem is a pure optimal stopping problem
eV (y)
= sup
2S
E
24 Z
0
av eUa(ya 1v v; ya 1v vwv)dv + y Z
0
vwvdv +
TZ

av eU r(ya 1v v)dv
35
= sup
2S
E
24 Z
0
(avu
a (cv; l

v)  yvev) dv +
Z
0
yvwvdv
+
TZ

(avu
r (cv; 1)  yvcv) dv
35 :
Let
Dt
,
tZ
0
(avu
a (cv; l

v)  yvev) dv +
tZ
0
yvwvdv + Et
24 TZ
t
(avu
r (cv; 1)  yvcv) dv
35 ;
and
Jt
, sup
2S
Et [D ]
= sup
2S
Et
24 Z
0
(avu
a (cv; l

v)  yvev) dv +
Z
0
yvwvdv
+
TZ

(avu
r (cv; 1)  yvcv) dv
35 :
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Jt is known as the Snell Envelope ofDt and it is the smallest supermartingale majorant of
Dt
1. The optimal stopping time is  t = inf fs 2 [t; T ] : Js = Dsg. The next proposition
gives the early exercise premium (EEP) representation of Jt. The EEP representation
corresponds to the Riesz decomposition of the Snell Envelope which was proposed by El
Karoui and Karatzas (1991) and applied by Myneni (1992) for pricing American options.
It decomposes the Snell Envelope to the sum of a martingale and a potential2.
Proposition 3.
Jt = J
n
t + J
a
t ;
where
Jnt =
tZ
0
avu
a (cv; l

v) dv + y
24 tZ
0
vwvdv  
tZ
0
ve

vdv
35
+Et
24 TZ
t
avu
a (cv; l

v) dv
35+ y
24Et
24 TZ
t
vwvdv
35  Et
24 TZ
t
ve

vdv
3535 ;
Jat =  Et
24 TZ
t
avu
a (cv; l

v) 1R(v)dv
35+ Et
24 TZ
t
avu
r (cv; 1) 1R(v)dv
35
+y
24 Et
24 TZ
t
vwv1R(v)dv
35+ Et
24 TZ
t
ve

v1R(v)dv
35
 Et
24 TZ
t
vc

v1R(v)dv
3535 ;
and R (v)  fv =  vg is the immediate retirement region at time v.
Proof. On ft <  tg, we have Js = Es

Dt

for t  s <  t , thus Jt is a martingale
1Et [Js] = Et

Es

Ds

= Et

Ds
  Et Dt  = Jt, 8s  t. And Jt = sup
2S
Et [D ]  Dt. Suppose
J t is a supermartingale majorant of Dt, we have Jt = Et

Dt
  Et Jt   J t.
2A potential is a right-continuous, nonnegative supermartingale with expected value converging to
0 as time goes to innity.
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and dJt =  tdWt for some  t, E
hR T
0
 2tdt
i
< 1; on ft =  tg, Jt = Dt and is a
supermartingale. Doob-Meyer decomposition gives Jt = J0 + Mt   At, where Mt is an
RCLL martingale and At is continuous and nondecreasing. RCLL martingale of the
Brownian ltration is continuous3, Mt is continuous, thus Jt is continuous.
JT   Jt =
TZ
t
dJv
=
TZ
t
1fv<vgdJv +
TZ
t
1fv=vgdJv;
and
Et [JT   Jt] = Et
24 TZ
t
1fv<vgdJv +
TZ
t
1fv=vgdJv
35
= Et
24 TZ
t
1fv<vg vdWv +
TZ
t
1fv=vgdDv
35
= Et
24 TZ
t
1fv=vgdDv
35 :
Thus
Jt = Et [JT ]  Et
24 TZ
t
1fv=vgdDv
35
= Jnt + J
a
t ;
3See Karatzas and Shreve (1991), chapter 3, problem 4.16.
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where
Jnt = Et [JT ]
= Et
24 TZ
0
avu
a (cv; l

v) dv
35+ y
24Et
24 TZ
0
vwvdv
35  Et
24 TZ
0
ve

vdv
3535
=
tZ
0
avu
a (cv; l

v) dv + y
24 tZ
0
vwvdv  
tZ
0
ve

vdv
35
+Et
24 TZ
t
avu
a (cv; l

v) dv
35+ y
24Et
24 TZ
t
vwvdv
35  Et
24 TZ
t
ve

vdv
3535 ;
and
Jat =  Et
24 TZ
t
1fv=vgdDv
35
=  Et
24 TZ
t
avu
a (cv; l

v) 1R(v)dv
35+ Et
24 TZ
t
avu
r (cv; 1) 1R(v)dv
35
+y
24 Et
24 TZ
t
vwv1R(v)dv
35+ Et
24 TZ
t
ve

v1R(v)dv
35
 Et
24 TZ
t
vc

v1R(v)dv
3535 : 
Jnt is the value of Jt when the stopping time  is equal to T . J
n
t is a martingale. The
early retirement premium Jat is a supermartingale which converges to 0 as t approaches
T and it corresponds to the potential in the Riesz decomposition. The net local gains
from early retirement is avur (cv; 1)   avua (cv; lv) + yvev   yvwv   yvcv. The rst
component avur (cv; 1) is instantaneous utility gain from immediately retiring. The
second component  avua (cv; lv) represents the instantaneous utility loss incurred upon
retiring. The next three components are transformations from monetary terms to utility
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terms by the marginal cost yv. yve

v represents the utility loss from total expenditure
avoided by the individual from early retiring.  yvwv represents the utility gain from
wages forgone by early retiring.  yvcv represents the utility loss incurred from retire-
ment consumption in the next increment of time. Immediate retirement is optimal when
the net local gain is su¢ ciently large. An immediate corollary is that an individual will
never retire prior to T if avur (cv; 1)  avua (cv; lv) + yvev   yvwv   yvcv  0 for all
v 2 [0; T ]. A counterpart of the EEP representation is the delayed exercise premium
(DEP) representation that emphasizes the local gains from delaying retirement.
Proposition 4.
Jt = Dt + J
d
t ;
where Dt is the immediate retirement value function and the DEP is
Jdt = Et
24 TZ
t
avu
a (cv; l

v) 1fv<vgdv
35  Et
24 TZ
t
avu
r (cv; 1) 1fv<vgdv
35
+y
24Et
24 TZ
t
vwv1fv<vgdv
35  Et
24 TZ
t
ve

v1fv<vgdv
35
+Et
24 TZ
t
vc

v1fv<vgdv
3535 :
Proof.
Jt = sup
2S
Et [D ] = Et

Dt

;
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where  t is the optimal stopping time at time t. We have
Jt = Dt + Et

Dt  Dt

= Dt + Et
24 tZ
t
avu
a (cv; l

v) dv
35  Et
24 tZ
t
avu
r (cv; 1) dv
35
+y
24Et
24 tZ
t
vwvdv
35  Et
24 tZ
t
ve

vdv
35
+Et
24 tZ
t
vc

vdv
3535
= Dt + J
d
t : 
In the DEP representation, net local gains from delaying retirement is avur (cv; 1)+
avu
a (cv; l

v)  yvev + yvwv + yvcv.  avur (cv; 1) represents the instantaneous utility
loss from delaying retiring, but the individual benets from the instantaneous utility
gain avua (cv; l

v) before retirement.  yvev represents the utility loss from total expen-
diture incurred by the individual from delaying retiring. yvwv represents the utility
gain from wages enjoyed by delaying retiring. yvc

v represents the utility loss from
retirement consumption avoided by the individual from delaying retiring.
When  t = t, immediate retirement value function is
Dt =
tZ
0
avu
a (cv; l

v) dv + Et
24 TZ
t
avu
r (cv; 1) dv
35
+y
24 tZ
0
vwvdv  
tZ
0
ve

vdv   Et
24 TZ
t
vc

vdv
3535 :
In the immediate retirement region R (t), Jt = Jnt + Jat = Dt. This gives the equation
satised by the state variable xt 

yt
at
  1
R
w
(1 ) 1
t in the retirement region.
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Proposition 5. In the immediate retirement region R (t), we have
Et
24 TZ
t
avu
a (cv; l

v) 1A(v)dv
35+ yEt
24 TZ
t
vwv1A(v)dv
35 (2.9)
 yEt
24 TZ
t
ve

v1A(v)dv
35  Et
24 TZ
t
avu
r (cv; 1) 1A(v)dv
35
+yEt
24 TZ
t
vc

v1A(v)dv
35
= 0:
For cv, l

v and e

v in power utility, we have
R
1 RfxtG (t; T ; ; ; ;A) +G (t; T ; 0; 1; 0;A)
  R
1 R
1
R ztG (t; T ; ; ; 1;A) = 0;
where
xt 

yt
at
  1
R
w
(1 ) 1
t , zt 

yt
at
  1
R
w 1t ;
G (t; T ; ; ; )  Et
24 TZ
t
a
1
R
t;v

t;vw
(1 )
t;v dv
35 ;
G (t; T ; ; ; ;A)  Et
24 TZ
t
a
1
R
t;v

t;vw
(1 )
t;v 1A(v)dv
35 ;
and A (v)  fv <  vg is the continuation region at time v.
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Proof. Plugin the representations of Jnt , J
a
t and Yt and simplify, we get
Et
24 TZ
t
avu
a (cv; l

v) dv
35+ y
24Et
24 TZ
t
vwvdv
35  Et
24 TZ
t
ve

vdv
3535
 Et
24 TZ
t
avu
a (cv; l

v) 1R(v)dv
35+ Et
24 TZ
t
avu
r (cv; 1) 1R(v)dv
35
+y
24 Et
24 TZ
t
vwv1R(v)dv
35+ Et
24 TZ
t
ve

v1R(v)dv
35
 Et
24 TZ
t
vc

v1R(v)dv
3535
= Et
24 TZ
t
avu
r (cv; 1) dv
35  yEt
24 TZ
t
vc

vdv
35 ;
or
Et
24 TZ
t
avu
a (cv; l

v) 1A(v)dv
35+ yEt
24 TZ
t
vwv1A(v)dv
35
 yEt
24 TZ
t
ve

v1A(v)dv
35  Et
24 TZ
t
avu
r (cv; 1) 1A(v)dv
35
+yEt
24 TZ
t
vc

v1A(v)dv
35
= 0:
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For power utility, we have
Et
24 TZ
t
avu
a (cv; l

v) dv
35 = Et
24 TZ
t
yve

v
1 Rdv
35
=
yte

v
1 REt
24 TZ
t
t;ve

t;vdv
35 = ytev
1 REt
24 TZ
t
a
1
R
t;v

t;vw
(1 )
t;v dv
35
=
yte

v
1 RG (t; T ; ; ; ) ;
Et
24 TZ
t
avu
r (cv; 1) dv
35 = Et
24 TZ
t
yvc

v
1 Rdv
35
=
ytc

v
1 REt
24 TZ
t
t;vc

t;vdv
35 = ytcv
1 REt
24 TZ
t
a
1
R
t;v

t;vdv
35
=
ytc

v
1 RG (t; T ; ; ; 1) ;
Et
24 TZ
t
ve

vdv
35 = tevEt
24 TZ
t
t;ve

t;vdv
35
= te

vEt
24 TZ
t
a
1
R
t;v

t;vw
(1 )
t;v dv
35 = tevG (t; T ; ; ; ) ;
Et
24 TZ
t
vwvdv
35 = twtEt
24 TZ
t
t;vwt;vdv
35 = twtG (t; T ; 0; 1; 0) ;
Et
24 TZ
t
vc

vdv
35 = tcvEt
24 TZ
t
t;vc

t;vdv
35
= tc

vEt
24 TZ
t
a
1
R
t;v

t;vdv
35 = tcvG (t; T ; ; ; 1) :
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Therefore,
yte

v
1 RG (t; T ; ; ; ;A) + ytwtG (t; T ; 0; 1; 0;A)
 ytevG (t; T ; ; ; ;A) 
ytc

v
1 RG (t; T ; ; ; 1;A)
+ytc

vG (t; T ; ; ; 1;A)
= 0;
or
R
1 Ryte

vG (t; T ; ; ; ;A) + ytwtG (t; T ; 0; 1; 0;A)
  R
1 Rytc

vG (t; T ; ; ; 1;A)
= 0:
Plugin the optimal values of et and c

v, we have
R
1 Rf (at)
1
R (yt)
w
(1 )
t G (t; T ; ; ; ;A) + ytwtG (t; T ; 0; 1; 0;A)
  R
1 R
1
R (at)
1
R (yt)
G (t; T ; ; ; 1;A)
= 0;
or
R
1 RfxtG (t; T ; ; ; ;A) +G (t; T ; 0; 1; 0;A)
  R
1 R
1
R ztG (t; T ; ; ; 1;A)
= 0: 
How do we calculate the terms in equation (2:9) which are conditional expectations
of random variables restricted to the event of retirement? The next lemma gives closed
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form expressions for conditional expectations of random variables restricted to the event
of retirement and their derivatives with respect to the multiplier y. These expressions
are used for the representation of the optimal retirement boundary, the optimal wealth
and the optimal portfolio. First we specify a standing assumption that the immediate
retirement region R (t) is up connected for the state variable xt, then we can calculate
the conditional expectations involving the event fxt  Btg.
Assumption. The immediate retirement region R (t) is up connected for the state
variable xt.
Su¢ cient conditions to satisfy this assumption are R > 1 and w  =R. Under
these conditions, we can show that if xt is in the retirement region, then (xt; t) is also
in the retirement region, 8  1. See Proposition A1 and its proof in Appendix.
Lemma 6. Dene
C (; ) =  (   (1  )w) ;
A (; ; ) =

R
+ 

r +
1
2
2

  (1  ) 

w  
1
2
2w

  1
2
C (; )2 ;
and
d (xt; Bv; v;C (; )) =
1
x
p
v   t

log

xt
Bv

+

x  
1
2
2x   xC (; )

(v   t)

:
Then we have
G (t; T ; ; ; )
= Et
24 TZ
t
a
1
R
t;v

t;vw
(1 )
t;v dv
35
=
TZ
t
exp ( A (; ; ) (v   t)) dv;
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G (t; T ; ; ; ;R)
= Et
24 TZ
t
a
1
R
t;v

t;vw
(1 )
t;v 1R(v)dv
35
=
TZ
t
exp ( A (; ; ) (v   t))N (d (xt; Bv; v;C (; ))) dv;
G (t; T ; ; ; ;A)
= Et
24 TZ
t
a
1
R
t;v

t;vw
(1 )
t;v 1A(v)dv
35
=
TZ
t
exp ( A (; ; ) (v   t))N ( d (xt; Bv; v;C (; ))) dv;
@
@y
G (t; T ; ; ; ;R)
=
TZ
t
exp ( A (; ; ) (v   t))n (d (xt; Bv; v;C (; )))
 1
x
p
v   t
 
@xt
@y
xt
 
@Bv
@y
Bv
!
dv;
@
@y
G (t; T ; ; ; ;A)
=
TZ
t
exp ( A (; ; ) (v   t))n ( d (xt; Bv; v;C (; )))
 1
x
p
v   t
 
@Bv
@y
Bv
 
@xt
@y
xt
!
dv;
where N() is the cumulative distribution function of standard normal distribution and
n() is the probability density function of standard normal distribution.
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Proof. See appendix. 
Now we give the backward recursive equation satised by the retirement boundary
Bt of the state variable xt. The boundary Bt separates the retirement region R (t) and
the continuation region A (t), and the individual is optimal to retire when xt in A (t)
rst crosses Bt.
Theorem 7. The retirement boundary Bt satises the following backward recursive
equation
R
1 RfBt
TZ
t
exp ( A (; ; ) (v   t))N ( d (Bt; Bv; v;C (; ))) dv
+
TZ
t
exp ( A (0; 1; 0) (v   t))N ( d (Bt; Bv; v;C (1; 0))) dv
  R
1 R
1
R y 
1
R
(1 )w 1 ((1 ) 1)0 exp (t)B

t

TZ
t
exp ( A (; ; 1) (v   t))N ( d (Bt; Bv; v;C (; 1))) dv
= 0; (2.10)
with limiting condition of the boundary BT that satises
fBT    1R z0

BT
x0

exp (T ) = 1  1
R
;
where
 =
z
x
,  = z  
1
2
2z   

x  
1
2
2x

and zt =

yt
at
  1
R
w 1t :
Proof. We have shown that in the retirement region,
R
1 RfxtG (t; T ; ; ; ;A) +G (t; T ; 0; 1; 0;A)
  R
1 R
1
R ztG (t; T ; ; ; 1;A) = 0;
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where xv =

yv
av
  1
R
w
(1 ) 1
v and zv =

yv
av
  1
R
w 1v . For xv and zv we have
x =  

R
+
1
R

r +
1
2
2

+ ((1  )   1)

w  
1
2
2w

+
1
2
2x;
x =

R
+ ((1  )   1)w;
z =  

R
+
1
R

r +
1
2
2

 

w  
1
2
2w

+
1
2
2z;
z =

R
  w:
zv is a transform of xv,
zv = z0

xv
x0

exp (v) ;
where  = z
x
,  = z  122z 
 
x   122x

. Therefore we have in the retirement region,
R
1 Rfxt
TZ
t
exp ( A (; ; ) (v   t))N ( d (xt; Bv; v;C (; ))) dv
+
TZ
t
exp ( A (0; 1; 0) (v   t))N ( d (xt; Bv; v;C (1; 0))) dv
  R
1 R
1
R y 
1
R
(1 )w 1 ((1 ) 1)0 exp (t)x

t

TZ
t
exp ( A (; ; 1) (v   t))N ( d (xt; Bv; v;C (; 1))) dv
= 0:
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Substituting xt using Bt, the boundary Bt satises
R
1 RfBt
TZ
t
exp ( A (; ; ) (v   t))N ( d (Bt; Bv; v;C (; ))) dv
+
TZ
t
exp ( A (0; 1; 0) (v   t))N ( d (Bt; Bv; v;C (1; 0))) dv
  R
1 R
1
R y 
1
R
(1 )w 1 ((1 ) 1)0 exp (t)B

t

TZ
t
exp ( A (; ; 1) (v   t))N ( d (Bt; Bv; v;C (; 1))) dv
= 0:
Because terminal date T is considered as the deadline for retirement, at time T , retire-
ment must happen. The boundary condition for the backward recursive equation should
be that the instantaneous gain minus instantaneous loss in the early exercise premium is
equal to 0. In the early exercise premium representation, the instantaneous gain minus
instantaneous loss is
 avua (cv; lv) + avur (cv; 1)  yvwv + yvev   yvcv
=   yve

v
1 R +
yvc

v
1 R   yvwv + yve

v   yvcv
=   R
1 Ryve

v +
R
1 Ryvc

v   yvwv:
Let   R
1 Ryve

v +
R
1 Ryvc

v   yvwv be equal to 0, we have
  R
1 Ryve

v +
R
1 Ryvc

v   yvwv = 0
  R
1 R

yv
av
  1
R
w(1 ) 1v f +
R
1 R

yv
av
  1
R
w 1v 
1
R   1 = 0:
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Using the expressions of xv and zv, we have
fxv    1R zv = 1  1
R
;
or
fxv    1R z0

xv
x0

exp (v) = 1  1
R
:
Thus at time T , the limiting condition for BT is
fBT    1R z0

BT
x0

exp (T ) = 1  1
R
: 
Equation (2.10) is a backward recursive equation. To compute the solution Bt, we
use a recursive algorithm. Divide the interval [0; T ] into N subintervals [ti 1; ti], for
i = 1; : : : ; N , with equal length t = T=N . The terminal condition is BtN = BT . We
use trapezoidal rule to discretize the integrals in equation (2.10)4. For the rst integral
we have
TZ
t
exp ( A (; ; ) (v   t))N ( d (Bt; Bv; v;C (; ))) dv

N 1X
n=i+1
exp ( A (; ; ) (n  i) t)N ( d (Bti ; Btn ; tn;C (; ))) t
+N ( d (Bti ; Bti ; ti;C (; ))) t=2
+ exp ( A (; ; ) (N   i) t)N ( d (Bti ; BtN ; tN ;C (; ))) t=2:
We do the same discretization for the other two integrals. Suppose we have solved Btj
for all j > i, then the discretized equation (2.10) becomes a nonlinear equation of Bti .
At each time ti, i = 0; : : : ; N   1, we solve this nonlinear equation recursively. The true
retirement boundary is the limit of the solution of the discretized equation (2.10) when
4See Detemple (2006) chapter 8.2 for numerical procedures for solving backward recursive equations
derived from problems of pricing American options.
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N goes to innity. To solve the nonlinear equations at each step i, we implement an
e¢ cient procedure using Newton-Raphson iteration developed by Kallast and Kivinukk
(2003) for pricing American options. We denote the left hand side of the discretized
equation (2.10) by F (Bti). The iterative values are determined by
Bti;k+1 = Bti;k   F (Bti;k)=F 0(Bti;k); for k = 0; 1; 2; : : :
where F 0(Bti;k) is the derivative of F (Bti;k) with respect to Bti;k and the initial value
Bti;0 = Bti+1. The iteration is run until the di¤erence between two successive iterates
is su¢ ciently small. The convergence of the iteration is very fast since the point in
the boundary immediately after ti is chosen as the initial value at each step, thus is
very close to the true value. Figure 2.1 gives the optimal retirement boundary for state
variable xt when the initial liquid wealth is 0 with parameter values in Table 2.15.
Note that this optimal retirement boundary depends on time and an initial Lagrange
multiplier but does not depend on the underlying Brownian motion. The individual is
optimal to retire the moment that the state variable xt hits the boundary. Of course,
the state variable xt is not directly observable. The reason we choose to construct the
retirement boundary for xt is to facilitate the computation of equation (2:10). Later we
will construct an optimal retirement boundary for the liquid wealth Xt. Because Xt is
directly observable, the boundary of Xt is more practical and useful and an individual
can compare his observed liquid wealth with this boundary and know if its optimal to
retire immediately.
Next proposition gives the equation satised by the derivative of the retirement
boundary with respect to the multiplier y. @Bt
@y
is needed for the expressions and com-
putations of the optimal wealth and the optimal portfolio.
5Parameter values are the same as in the numerical studies of Bodie et al. (2012) which solves the
model for the case of deterministic retirement date.
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Table 2.1: Parameter values.
Interest rate r 0:02
Volatility of the market return  0:2
Market price of risk  0:3
Maximal amount of labor h 1
Expected growth rate of wage w 0:01
Volatility of growth rate of wage w 0:03
Initial value of wage w0 105
Measure of relative weight of consumption and labor  2=3
Coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion R 4
Subjective discount rate  0
Relative weight of the retirement phase  204
20 30 40 50 60 70 80
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
Age
Optimal retirement boundary
Figure 21: This gure shows the optimal retirement boundary for state
variable xt. Initial liquid wealth is 0.
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Proposition 8. The derivative of the boundary @Bt
@y
satises
R
1 Rf
@Bt
@y
GB (t; T ; ; ; ;A) (2.11)
  R
1 R
1
R y 
1
R
(1 )w 1 ((1 ) 1)0 exp (t)B

t
GB (t; T ; ; ; 1;A)
 
y 1

  1
R
(1  )

+ 
@Bt
@y
Bt
!
+
R
1 RfBt
@
@y
GB (t; T ; ; ; ;A) + @
@y
GB (t; T ; 0; 1; 0;A)
  R
1 R
1
R y 
1
R
(1 )w 1 ((1 ) 1)0 exp (t)B

t
@
@y
GB (t; T ; ; ; 1;A)
= 0;
with boundary condition
@BT
@y
=

1
R
   1
R
(1  ) y  1R (1 ) 1w 1 ((1 ) 1)0 exp (T )BT
f    1R y  1R (1 )w 1 ((1 ) 1)0 exp (T ) B 1T
; (2.12)
where
@
@y
GB (t; T ; ; ; ;A)
=
TZ
t
exp ( A (; ; ) (v   t))n ( d (Bt; Bv; v;C (; )))
 1
x
p
v   t
 
@Bv
@y
Bv
 
@Bt
@y
Bt
!
dv:
Proof. See appendix. 
Instead of solving the backward equation (2.11) using similar Newton-Raphson re-
cursive algorithm, a much easier way to compute the derivative of the boundary with
respect to the multiplier is to increase the multiplier y by a small amount y, for this
new multiplier y + y, use the same algorithm that solves equation (2.10) to com-
pute a new boundary Bt(y + y). The derivative can be approximated by @Bt@y 
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Derivative of optimal retirement boundary
Figure 22: This gure shows the derivative of the optimal retirement
boundary with respect to the multiplier y.
(Bt(y + y) Bt(y)) =y. Figure 2.2 gives the derivative of the optimal retirement
boundary with respect to the multiplier y for initial liquid wealth 0. In general, @Bt
@y
may be positive or negative depending on the parameter values, see the terminal con-
dition (2:12). For the parameter values in Table 1.1, @Bt
@y
is negative and the retirement
boundary will move higher for a smaller value of the multiplier.
2.5 Optimal liquid wealth, human capital and total wealth
For the optimal liquid wealth Xt, the human capital Ht and the total wealth Nt at time
t before retirement, we have
tXt = Et
264 

tZ
t
ve

vdv  
tZ
t
vwvdv +
TZ
t
vc

vdv
375 ;
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tHt = Et
24 tZ
t
vwvdv
35 ;
and
tNt = Et
264 

tZ
t
ve

vdv +
TZ
t
vc

vdv
375 :
The human capital is the present value of the maximal labor income until retirement.
The total wealth is the sum of the liquid wealth and the human capital, Nt = Xt +Ht.
The total wealth nances the total expenditure on consumption and leisure during the
accumulation phase and the consumption during the retirement phase. After retirement,
human capital is depleted. The total wealth is equal to the liquid wealth, which solely
nances the consumption during retirement and satises tXt = Et
hR T
t
vc

vdv
i
. These
expressions of the wealth components are not amenable to computational implementa-
tion and the next theorem gives the closed form expressions of the liquid wealth, the
human capital and the total wealth.
Theorem 9. We have the following representations of the wealth processes. Before
retirement, the optimal liquid wealth Xt satises
Xt = 
 1
t Et
264 

tZ
t
ve

vdv  
tZ
t
vwvdv +
TZ
t
vc

vdv
375
=  1t Et
264 

tZ
t
fa
1
R
v y
  1
R vw
(1 )
v dv  
tZ
t
vwvdv +
TZ
t

1
Ra
1
R
v y
  1
R vdv
375
= fa
1
R
t y
  1
R 
  1
R
t w
(1 )
t G (t; T ; ; ; ;A)  wtG (t; T ; 0; 1; 0;A) (2.13)
+
1
Ra
1
R
t y
  1
R 
  1
R
t G (t; T ; ; ; 1;R)
  R
1 Rfa
1
R
t y

  1
R
t w
(1 )
t
@
@y
G (t; T ; ; ; ;A)
 ywt @
@y
G (t; T ; 0; 1; 0;A)  R
1 R
1
Ra
1
R
t y

  1
R
t
@
@y
G (t; T ; ; ; 1;R) ;
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the human capital is
Ht = 
 1
t Et
24 tZ
t
vwvdv
35
= wtG (t; T ; 0; 1; 0;A)
+
R2
1 Rfa
1
R
t y

  1
R
t w
(1 )
t
@
@y
G (t; T ; ; ; ;A) +Rywt @
@y
G (t; T ; 0; 1; 0;A)
+
R2
1 R
1
Ra
1
R
t y

  1
R
t
@
@y
G (t; T ; ; ; 1;R) ;
and the total wealth is,
Nt = 
 1
t Et
264 

tZ
t
ve

vdv +
TZ
t
vc

vdv
375
= (yt)
 1Et
264 

tZ
t
a
1
R
v (yv)
w(1 )v fdv +
TZ
t

1
Ra
1
R
v (yv)
 dv
375
= fa
1
R
t (yt)
  1
R w
(1 )
t G (t; T ; ; ; ;A) + 
1
Ra
1
R
t (yt)
  1
R G (t; T ; ; ; 1;R)
 Rfa
1
R
t y

  1
R
t w
(1 )
t
@
@y
G (t; T ; ; ; ;A)  (1 R) ywt @
@y
G (t; T ; 0; 1; 0;A)
 R 1Ra
1
R
t y

  1
R
t
@
@y
G (t; T ; ; ; 1;R) :
After retirement, the human capital is exhausted and the liquid wealth is
Xt = 
 1
t Et
24 TZ
t
vc

vdv
35 =  1t Et
24 TZ
t
v

yv
av
  1
R

1
Rdv
35
= 
1
R

yt
at
  1
R
G (t; T ; ; ; 1) :
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Proof. We have
Jt
= sup
2S
Et
24 Z
0
R
1 Rfa
1
R
v (yv)
w(1 )v dv +
Z
0
yvwvdv
+
TZ

R
1 R
1
Ra
1
R
v (yv)
 dv
35
=
tZ
0
R
1 Rfa
1
R
v (yv)
w(1 )v dv +
tZ
0
yvwvdv
+sup
2S
Et
24 Z
t
R
1 Rfa
1
R
v (yv)
w(1 )v dv +
Z
t
yvwvdv
+
TZ

R
1 R
1
Ra
1
R
v (yv)
 dv
35 :
Denote
Lt  Jt  
24 tZ
0
R
1 Rfa
1
R
v (yv)
w(1 )v dv +
tZ
0
yvwvdv
35 :
Thus
Lt = sup
2S
Et
24 Z
t
R
1 Rfa
1
R
v (yv)
w(1 )v dv +
Z
t
yvwvdv
+
TZ

R
1 R
1
Ra
1
R
v (yv)
 dv
35
= Et
24 tZ
t
R
1 Rfa
1
R
v (yv)
w(1 )v dv +
tZ
t
yvwvdv
+
TZ
t
R
1 R
1
Ra
1
R
v (yv)
 dv
375 ;
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where  t is the optimal stopping time. Liquid wealth Xt satises
tXt = Et
264 

tZ
t
ve

vdv  
tZ
t
vwvdv +
TZ
t
vc

vdv
375 :
Plug in the values of ev and c

v,
tXt = Et
264 

tZ
t
fa
1
R
v y
  1
R vw
(1 )
v dv  
tZ
t
vwvdv +
TZ
t

1
Ra
1
R
v y
  1
R vdv
375 :
Use the same proof in Proposition 2, Lt is a convex function of y and the derivative of
Lt with respect to the multiplier y satises
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Use Early Exercise Premium representation to write Lt as the following
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Therefore,
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(2:14) + y  (2:15), canceling terms, we get
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Note that in the representations of the liquid wealth Xt, the human capital Ht and
the total wealth Nt, each can be decomposed into two parts. The rst part involves
the conditional expectations G, and the second part involves the derivative of the con-
ditional expectations with respect to the multiplier @
@y
G. Thus the wealth depends on
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the derivative of the boundary with respect to y. Its not hard to see that the rst part
that involves the conditional expectations is precisely the representation of the wealth
according to early exercise premium representation. For example, total wealth
Nt = 
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If we write down the EEP representation for Nt, it is
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which is the rst part in the representation of the total wealth that involves only the
conditional expectations. Therefore, the second part that involves the derivative of
the conditional expectations with respect to the multiplier is the discrepancy between
the EEP representation of the wealth and their true value. The reason that the EEP
representation does not hold for the wealth processes is that the optimal stopping time
is not maximizing the wealth process, but maximizing the value function Jt. Jt is a Snell
Envelope and the wealth processes are not.
For numerical implementation, we simulate 10 realizations per year from age 20 to
age 80, in total 600 data points. Figure 2.3 shows a particular trajectory of the state
variable xt. xt crosses the optimal retirement boundary (shown previously in Figure 2.1)
at about age 72, i.e., the individual under this particular trajectory is optimal to retire at
age 72. Figure 2.4 gives the stock market index and wage process under this trajectory.
The stock market data is from age 20 to age 80, and the wage process is from age 20
to the retirement age 72. The stock market experiences an increase at about age 40, so
does the wage process. The state variable xt is positively related to the stock market
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and the wage process if its volatility =R+((1  )   1)w is positive. For parameters
chosen in Table 2.1, the volatility of xt is positive. The increase of the state variable xt
at age 40 reduces the distance between xt and the boundary, but is not su¢ cient for xt
to touch the boundary. We observe sharp increases in the stock market and the wage
process starting about age 60, and the increase of the state variable xt makes it cross
the boundary at about age 72. Figure 2.5 gives the corresponding trajectory of the total
wealth, the liquid wealth and the human capital6. At age 20, the liquid wealth of the
individual is 0, his total wealth is solely in the form of human capital. As stock market
and wage increases, the individuals liquid wealth increases and reaches a maximum of
about 2million at about age 40 when the stock market and the wage reaches a local peak
(As later shown in the optimal portfolio, the individual under this trajectory is long the
market). Human capital is about 3:4 million at age 20 and roughly follows a decreasing
path as the remaining work life shortens. Human capital reaches 0 the moment that the
individual retires at about age 72. At age 72, the individual has liquid wealth about 1:2
million which is solely used to nance retirement consumption. At time T age 80, all
wealth are depleted.
Note that the trajectory of the state variable xt might cross the boundary multiple
times, for example in Figure 2.6. Under this trajectory, the individual is optimal to
retire at about age 55. If the individual does not retire at age 55 but continues to work,
he has welfare loss at age 55. Of course, at any time t, the optimization problem restarts.
At any age between 55 and 59, immediate retirement is optimal. At any age between
6For computations of the wealth processes, notice that in the representation of
the term @@yG (t; T ;; ; ;A),
p
v   t is in the denominator inside the integral, thus
its divergent when v approaches t. A change of variable is needed for these
terms in numerical computation. Let
p
v   t = u, we get @@yG (t; T ;; ; ;A) =R T
t
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
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RpT t
0
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Figure 23: This gure shows the state variable crosses the boundary at
about age 72.
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Figure 24: This gure shows a trajectory of the stock market from age
20 to 80 and a trajectory of wage from age 20 to retirement.
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Figure 25: This gure shows total wealth (blue path), liquid wealth
(green path) and human capital (red path).
59 and 61, the optimal policy is to continue working. After 61, the state variable xt
remains inside the optimal retirement region and its optimal to retire immediately.
The next theorem gives the closed form expression of the retirement boundary for
the liquid wealth. This boundary is more practical and useful because an individual
can compare his observed liquid wealth with this boundary and know if its optimal to
retire immediately. Immediate retirement is optimal when his liquid wealth crosses this
boundary.
Theorem 10. For R > 1, retirement is optimal when the liquid wealth crosses its
boundary, i.e.,
Xt   1R y  1R(1+=R)a
1
R
t G (t; T ; ; ; 1)w
((1 ) 1)=R
0 exp

  1
R
t

B
 =R
t ; (2.16)
where  =
 
x
,  =  r   122   
 
x   122x

and Bt is the boundary for the state
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retirement boundary multiple times.
variable xt.
Proof. Liquid wealth before retirement is
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where  t is the optimal stopping time. Plug in the values of e
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Liquid wealth after retirement is
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It is shown7 that retirement is optimal when t becomes su¢ ciently low, or wt becomes
su¢ ciently large, or xt = a
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Therefore, in order to show that the boundary of 
1
R
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the retire boundary of liquid wealth, we also need to show that before retirement, liquid
wealth is less than the boundary of 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7See appendix Proposition A1.
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retirement, the value of 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Optimal value function
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For R > 1, we get Xt;b  Xt;a. To compute the form of the boundary of liquid wealth,
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we have
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Therefore, after we compute the boundary Bt of xt, the boundary of liquid wealth is
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Figure 2.7 gives the retirement boundary for the liquid wealth and the trajectory of the
liquid wealth (shown previously in Figure 2.5). It shows that the liquid wealth crosses
its optimal retirement boundary at about age 72, the same time as the state variable xt
crosses Bt.
2.6 Optimal consumption, optimal labor and optimal expendi-
ture
We derived the optimal consumption, the optimal leisure and the optimal expenditure in
proposition 2 and now we know the expressions of the initial budget constraint satised
by the multiplier, i.e., equation (2:13) at time 0, thus we can nd the multiplier y.
We have the following solutions for optimal consumption, optimal leisure and optimal
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Figure 27: This gure shows that the liquid wealth crosses its optimal
retirement boundary at about age 72.
expenditure. Optimal labor is the di¤erence between the maximal amount of labor
h endowed (normalized to be 1) and the optimal leisure lv, i.e., h

v = 1   lv. Before
retirement, we have
cv = 

yv
av
  1
R
w(1 )v f;
lv = (1  )

yv
av
  1
R
w(1 )v f
1
wv
;
ev =
cv

=

yv
av
  1
R
w(1 )v f;
and after retirement we have
cv =

yv
av
  1
R

1
R ;
where  = 1   1
R
, f = 1


1 

 (1 )
and the multiplier y satises equation (2.13) at
time 0.
The optimal policies are derived from the rst order conditions to equate marginal
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benets and marginal costs. Consumption is increasing with respect to 
  1
R
v w
(1 )
v and
consumption volatility 
R
+ (1  ) w is positive, therefore in a state where the stock
market experiences a positive shock, its optimal to consume more, ceteris paribus. For
leisure, its volatility is 
R
+((1  )   1)w, the e¤ect of stock market shock depends on
whether the volatility is positive or negative. When leisure volatility is positive, leisure
is positively related to the stock market and when leisure volatility is negative, they are
negatively related. After retirement, consumption volatility is 
R
, which is smaller than
consumption volatility before retirement and is decreasing with respect to coe¢ cient
of relative risk aversion R. When the wage is deterministic, w = 0, consumption
volatility before and after retirement and leisure volatility are all equal to 
R
. When
w = 0, consumption and leisure are both decreasing with respect to state price density
v, thus it pays to consume more and have more leisure when SPD is low, that is, when
the stock market experiences positive shocks.
 is the measure of relative weight of consumption and labor. In the total expenditure
ev, the percentage that the individual spends on consumption is , and the percentage
that the individual spends on leisure is 1   with opportunity cost being the wage wv.
This is due to Cobb-Douglas utility that the individual spends certain percentage on
each goods. The larger the value of , the larger the percentage spent on consumption
and the smaller the percentage spent on leisure. When  approaches to 1, leisure will
no longer be valued.
 is the coe¢ cient that measures the relative weight of the retirement phase, and it
also controls the disruption of the consumption when the individual enters the retirement
phase. The disruption is measured by the ratio of the consumption immediately after
retirement and the consumption just before retirement,
ratio =

1
R
w
(1 )
v f
:
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Figure 28: This gure shows the optimal consumption before and after
retirement.
Figure 2.8 shows the optimal consumption before and after retirement and Figure 2.9
shows the optimal leisure before and after retirement. The optimal consumption and
the optimal leisure both have positive volatilities for parameter values in Table 2.1, thus
are positively related to the stock market. For this particular trajectory of underlying
Brownian motion, the optimal consumption and the optimal leisure both reach a local
maximum at around age 40 as the stock market and the wage reach a local peak which
boosts the liquid wealth and the total wealth. As time approaches the retirement age 72,
the optimal consumption and the optimal leisure are both at high levels, when the liquid
wealth reaches a level su¢ cient high for the individual to retire. Note that at retirement
age, the consumption experiences a sudden drop. The disruption is controlled by the
ratio 
1
R
w
(1 )
v f
, which is related to the wage level the moment before retirement. This
is due to the structural change in the individuals preferences at the retirement date.
Leisure jumps to the level of 1 at retirement and remains at the level as the individual
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Figure 29: This gure shows the optimal leisure before and after retire-
ment.
no longer supplies labor.
Consumption, leisure and total expenditure are increasing with respect to the initial
wealth. L0 is a convex function of the multiplier y. Since @L0@y =  x, initial wealth
is a decreasing function of y. When initial wealth is higher, the multiplier y becomes
smaller, which results in higher consumption, leisure and total expenditure. Table 2.2
shows the impact of the initial liquid wealth on the optimal consumption, optimal leisure
and optimal total expenditure. Without loss of generality, the impact on initial optimal
consumption, optimal leisure and optimal total expenditure is reported. For example,
if initial liquid wealth increases from 0 to 250; 000, initial optimal total expenditure
increases from 109; 160 to 116; 740, out of which 66:6% is spent for the optimal con-
sumption and 33:3% is spent for the optimal leisure with opportunity cost being the
initial wage 100; 000. When initial liquid wealth increases, at any time before retire-
ment, the optimal consumption, leisure and total expenditures increase. When initial
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Table 2.2: The impact of the initial liquid wealth on the optimal con-
sumption, leisure and total expenditure.
Initial liquid wealth x Consumption c0 Leisure l0 Total expenditure e0
0 72; 774 0:36387 109; 160
50; 000 73; 785 0:36893 110; 678
100; 000 74; 796 0:37398 112; 194
150; 000 75; 807 0:37903 113; 710
200; 000 76; 817 0:38408 115; 225
250; 000 77; 826 0:38913 116; 740
liquid wealth increases, at any time after retirement, the optimal consumption, leisure
and total expenditures also increase.
Next proposition compares the optimal policies for the individual who has the option
to retire with the optimal policies for the individual who has no option to retire (work
until time T ).
Proposition 11. If x > E
hR T
0
ve

vdv  
R T
0
vwvdv
i
, then for the same initial wealth,
the optimal consumption, the optimal leisure and the optimal expenditure before retire-
ment for the individual who has the option to retire are lower than the corresponding
optimal policies when the individual has no option to retire (work until time T ). If
x  E
hR T
0
ve

vdv  
R T
0
vwvdv
i
, then for the same initial wealth, the optimal consump-
tion, the optimal leisure and the optimal expenditure before retirement for the individual
who has the option to retire are higher than or equal to the corresponding optimal policies
when the individual has no option to retire.
Proof. Lt is a convex function of the multiplier y. Since @Lt@y =  tXt, Xt is a
decreasing function of y. To compare the optimal policies of an individual who has
the option to retire before T with the optimal policies of an individual who has no
option to retire, since the rst order conditions of the optimization problems are the
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same, we just need to compare the values of the multiplier y for the two problems.
If x > E
hR T
0
ve

vdv  
R T
0
vwvdv
i
, then for the same initial wealth, the multiplier for
the individual with the option to retire is higher than the multiplier for the individual
with no option to retire, therefore the optimal consumption, the optimal labor and the
optimal expenditure before retirement for the individual who has the option to retire
are lower than the corresponding optimal policies when the individual has no option to
retire. And vice versa. 
For the parameter values in Table 2.1, we calculate,
E
24 TZ
0
ve

vdv  
TZ
0
vwvdv
35
= fy 
1
Rw
(1 )
0 G (0; T ; ; ; )  w0G (0; T ; 0; 1; 0) ;
which gives  3; 622. Therefore we have x = 0 > E
hR T
0
ve

vdv  
R T
0
vwvdv
i
. For the
same initial wealth  3; 622, we can calculate the optimal consumption, the optimal
leisure and the optimal expenditure for the individual with the retirement option. They
are uniformly lower than the corresponding optimal policies for the individual without
the retirement option at any time before the rst individual retires. Table 2.3 shows the
di¤erence in the initial optimal policies between the two individuals. Since the di¤erence
between 0 and  3; 622 is relatively small, the impact of retirement option on the optimal
consumption, the optimal leisure and the optimal expenditure is not signicant. With
retirement option, the individual consumes only 109 less in total expenditure annually.
2.7 Optimal portfolio
The optimal portfolio t is derived in the next theorem. Before retirement, the optimal
portfolio can be decomposed into two parts 1t and 2t, where 1t is the mean-variance
component, and 2t is the hedging demand against uctuations in wages. When the
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Table 2.3: The impact of the retirement option on the optimal consump-
tion, leisure and total expenditure.
with retirement option without retirement option
Initial liquid wealth x  3; 622  3; 622
Consumption c0 72; 700 72; 774
Leisure l0 0:36350 0:36387
Total expenditure e0 109; 051 109; 160
wage process is deterministic, i.e., w = 0, the hedging demand 2t vanishes. After
retirement, the optimal portfolio only consists of a mean-variance component as the
individual no longer earns wages.
Theorem 12. Before retirement, the optimal portfolio t satises
t
= (=R + (1  ) w) fa
1
R
t y
  1
R 
  1
R
t w
(1 )
t f1   wwtf2
+(=R)
1
Ra
1
R
t y
  1
R 
  1
R
t f3
  (=R + (1  ) w) R
1 Rfa
1
R
t y

  1
R
t w
(1 )
t f4
 wywtf5   (=R) R
1 R
1
Ra
1
R
t y

  1
R
t f6
+ (=R + ((1  )   1)w)

h
fa
1
R
t y
  1
R 
  1
R
t w
(1 )
t f7   wtf8 + 
1
Ra
1
R
t y
  1
R 
  1
R
t f9
  R
1 Rfa
1
R
t y

  1
R
t w
(1 )
t f10   ywtf11  
R
1 R
1
Ra
1
R
t y

  1
R
t f12

:
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And we have t = 1t + 2t, where
1t =
1
R
 1

h
fa
1
R
t y
  1
R 
  1
R
t w
(1 )
t f1 + 
1
Ra
1
R
t y
  1
R 
  1
R
t f3
  R
1 Rfa
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R
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
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R
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(1 )
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1 R
1
Ra
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R
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R
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R
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R
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1 Rfa
1
R
t y

  1
R
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R
t y

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R
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;
2t = 
 1w

h
(1  ) fa
1
R
t y
  1
R 
  1
R
t w
(1 )
t f1   wtf2
  (1  )  R
1 Rfa
1
R
t y

  1
R
t w
(1 )
t f4   ywtf5
+((1  )   1)
(fa
1
R
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  1
R 
  1
R
t w
(1 )
t f7   wtf8 + 
1
Ra
1
R
t y
  1
R 
  1
R
t f9
  R
1 Rfa
1
R
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
  1
R
t w
(1 )
t f10   ywtf11  
R
1 R
1
Ra
1
R
t y

  1
R
t f12)
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:
And the explicit expressions of f1 to f12 are,
f1 =
TZ
t
exp ( A (; ; ) (v   t))N ( d (xt; Bv; v;C (; ))) dv;
f2 =
TZ
t
exp ( A (0; 1; 0) (v   t))N ( d (xt; Bv; v;C (1; 0))) dv;
f3 =
TZ
t
exp ( A (; ; 1) (v   t))N (d (xt; Bv; v;C (; 1))) dv;
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f4 =
TZ
t
exp ( A (; ; ) (v   t))n ( d (xt; Bv; v;C (; )))
 1
x
p
v   t
 
@Bv
@y
Bv
 
@xt
@y
xt
!
dv;
f5 =
TZ
t
exp ( A (0; 1; 0) (v   t))n ( d (xt; Bv; v;C (1; 0)))
 1
x
p
v   t
 
@Bv
@y
Bv
 
@xt
@y
xt
!
dv;
f6 =
TZ
t
exp ( A (; ; 1) (v   t))n (d (xt; Bv; v;C (; 1)))
 1
x
p
v   t
 
@xt
@y
xt
 
@Bv
@y
Bv
!
dv;
f7 =  
TZ
t
exp ( A (; ; ) (v   t))n ( d (xt; Bv; v;C (; ))) 1
x
p
v   tdv;
f8 =  
TZ
t
exp ( A (0; 1; 0) (v   t))n ( d (xt; Bv; v;C (1; 0))) 1
x
p
v   tdv;
f9 =
TZ
t
exp ( A (; ; 1) (v   t))n (d (xt; Bv; v;C (; 1))) 1
x
p
v   tdv;
f10 =  
TZ
t
d (xt; Bv; v;C (; )) exp ( A (; ; ) (v   t))
n ( d (xt; Bv; v;C (; ))) 1
2x (v   t)
 
@Bv
@y
Bv
 
@xt
@y
xt
!
dv;
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f11 =  
TZ
t
d (xt; Bv; v;C (1; 0)) exp ( A (0; 1; 0) (v   t))
n ( d (xt; Bv; v;C (1; 0))) 1
2x (v   t)
 
@Bv
@y
Bv
 
@xt
@y
xt
!
dv;
f12 =  
TZ
t
d (xt; Bv; v;C (; 1)) exp ( A (; ; 1) (v   t))
n (d (xt; Bv; v;C (; 1))) 1
2x (v   t)
 
@xt
@y
xt
 
@Bv
@y
Bv
!
dv:
After retirement, the optimal portfolio is t = 1R
 1
1
R

yt
at
  1
R
G (t; T ; ; ; 1) :
Proof. Plugin the expressions of
G (t; T ; ; ; ;A) , G (t; T ; 0; 1; 0;A) , G (t; T ; ; ; 1;R) ,
@
@y
G (t; T ; ; ; ;A) , @
@y
G (t; T ; 0; 1; 0;A) , @
@y
G (t; T ; ; ; 1;R)
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in the representation of Xt, we get
Xt
= fa
1
R
t y
  1
R 
  1
R
t w
(1 )
t
TZ
t
exp ( A (; ; ) (v   t))
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x
p
v   t
 
@xt
@y
xt
 
@Bv
@y
Bv
!
dv;
then apply Clark-Ocone formula8 on the right hand side of the equation and equate the
volatility on both sides. 
Figure 2.10 shows the portfolio components, the mean variance component and the
hedge against uctuations in wages9. For this particular trajectory, before retirement,
8See Detemple et al. (2003) appendix D and Ocone and Karatzas (1991).
9For computations of the portfolio components, notice that in the representations of the terms
69
20 40 60 80
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
x 10
6
Age
Mean variance
component
20 40 60 80
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
x 10
5
Age
Hedge against
fluctuations in wages
Figure 210: This gure shows the portfolio components.
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Figure 211: This gure shows the optimal portfolio and cash holdings
before and after retirement.
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the mean variance component dominates the hedge against uctuations in wages, thus
the equity holdings in Figure 2.11 is very similar to the mean variance component. The
mean variance component reaches its maximum at about age 40, when the stock market
reaches a local peak. We observe that the mean variance component is positive while
the wage hedge is negative. After retirement, the mean variance component converges
to 0 at age approaches 80. Wage hedge after retirement is 0 as wage is 0. We observe
that this individual is long the market all the time and borrowing cash during most
of the time before retirement. At the retirement date, both equity holdings and cash
holdings experience a discontinuity. The individual sell about 0:8 million stock for cash.
At age approaches 80, both equity holdings and cash holdings are converging to 0.
f10, f11, f12, v   t is in the denominator inside the integral, thus its divergent when v approaches
t. A change of variable is needed for numerically computing these terms. Let v   t = exp(u), we get
f10 =  
R log(T t)
 1 d
 
xt; Bexp(u)+t; exp(u) + t;C (; )

exp ( A (; ; ) exp(u))
n   d  xt; Bexp(u)+t; exp(u) + t;C (; ) 12x
 @Bexp(u)+t
@y
Bexp(u)+t
 
@xt
@y
xt

du.
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Chapter 3
Optimal consumption, labor, portfolio and
retirement for individuals with log utility
3.1 Introduction
For an individual with log utility, the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion is equal to 1.
Choi and Shim (2006) provide an explicit solution for log utility, for the case of innite
horizon where the individual is innitely lived with disutility from labor before retire-
ment, using dynamic programming approach. We complement the existing literature by
providing closed form solutions for the nite horizon using the martingale and convex
duality approach.
We nd that before retirement, if the initial multiplier of an individual with power
utility and the initial multiplier of an individual with log utility are equal, then the
optimal consumption and labor of an individual with log utility are the limits of the
optimal consumption and labor of an individual with power utility when the coe¢ cient
of relative risk aversion converges to 1. Furthermore, if not only the multipliers are
equal but also the two individuals have the same optimal retirement boundaries of the
state variable, then the optimal liquid wealth, the optimal retirement boundary of the
liquid wealth and the optimal portfolio of an individual with log utility are the limits
of the optimal liquid wealth, the optimal retirement boundary of the liquid wealth and
the optimal portfolio of an individual with power utility when the coe¢ cient of relative
risk aversion approaches to 1.
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When do the individual with log utility and the individual with power utility have
the same optimal retirement boundaries of the state variable? We nd that in general,
the two individuals have di¤erent retirement boundaries of the state variable even if all
parameters for the two individuals are the same, the initial multipliers are the same and
the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion converges to 1. However, under the condition
that the coe¢ cient  which measures the relative weight of the retirement phase is
equal to 1= where  is a measure of relative weight of consumption and leisure, the
two individuals will have the same optimal retirement boundaries of the state variable if
all parameters for the two individuals are the same, the initial multipliers are the same
and the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion converges to 1. And when do they have the
same multipliers? Since the multiplier is endogenous and it depends on the initial liquid
wealth, varying the level of initial liquid wealth can ensure the two individuals have the
same multiplier.
After retirement, as long as the two individuals have the same value of initial mul-
tiplier, the optimal consumption, labor, wealth and portfolio of an individual with log
utility are the limits of the corresponding optimal policies of an individual with power
utility when the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion converges to 1.
The maximization problem for the individual with log utility is
V (x) = sup
2S; (c;l;)2A
E
24 Z
0
avu
a (cv; lv) dv + 
TZ

avu
r (cv; 1) dv
35
where ua (cv; lv) = 1 ( ln (cv) + (1  ) ln (lv)), ur (cv; 1) = ln (cv) and av = exp ( v),
subject to the static budget constraint
E
24 Z
0
v (cv   wv + wvlv) dv +
TZ

vcvdv
35  x:
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3.2 Pure optimal stopping problem
Before retirement, the utility function is
avu
a (cv; lv) = av
1

( ln (cv) + (1  ) ln (lv)) :
First order conditions give
avu
a
c (cv; lv) = avc
 1
v = yv; avu
a
l (cv; lv) = av
1  

l 1v = yvwv:
Calculations give the following solutions
cv = 

yv
av
 1
f; lv = (1  )

yv
av
 1
f
1
wv
;
ev  cv + lvwv =

yv
av
 1
f;
where
f = 1= () f = 1:
After retirement, the utility function is
avu
r (cv; 1) = av ln (cv) :
First order condition gives
avu
r
c (cv; 1) = avc
 1
v = yv:
Thus
cv =

yv
av
 1
:
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Calculations show
 ln (cv) + (1  ) ln (lv)
=  ln
 


yv
av
 1
f
!
+ (1  ) ln
 
(1  )

yv
av
 1
f
1
wv
!
=   ln

yv
av

  (1  ) ln (wv) + (1  ) ln

1  


;
avu
a (cv; l

v) =  av

1

ln

yv
av

+
1  

ln (wv)  1  

ln

1  


;
av eUa(ya 1v v; ya 1v vwv)
= avu
a (cv; l

v)  yvcv   yvwvlv
=  av

1

ln

yv
av

+
1  

ln (wv)  1  

ln

1  


  av   1  

av
=  av

1

ln

yv
av

+
1  

ln (wv)  1  

ln

1  


+
1


:
av eUa(ya 1v v; ya 1v vwv) is a convex function of y.
av eU r(ya 1v v) = avur (cv; 1)  yvcv
= av

  ln

yv
av

+ ln ()

  av
= av

  ln

yv
av

+ ln ()  1

:
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av eU r(ya 1v v) is a convex function of y. Now we have
eJ (y; )
= E
24 Z
0
av eUa(ya 1v v; ya 1v vwv)dv + y Z
0
vwvdv +
TZ

av eU r(ya 1v v)dv
35
= E
24 Z
0
 av

1

ln

yv
av

+
1  

ln (wv)  1  

ln

1  


+
1


dv
+y
Z
0
vwvdv +
TZ

av

  ln

yv
av

+ ln ()  1

dv
35 :
eJ (y; ), as the sum of the three parts above, is also a convex function of y.
x (y) = E
24 Z
0
(vc

v + vwvl

v) dv  
Z
0
vwvdv +
TZ

vc

vdv
35
= E
24 Z
0
1

y 1avdv  
Z
0
vwvdv +
TZ

y 1avdv
35 :
eV (y) = sup
2S
eJ (y; ) and denote the stopping time that attains the supremum by  y,
i.e., eV (y) = eJ  y;  y. The same proof as in Proposition 2 gives eV 0(y) =  xy (y) and
V (x) = inf
y>0
heV (y) + yxi. This shows that we can rst solve the pure optimal stopping
problem of eV (y), while treating the multiplier y as a constant.
3.3 Optimal retirement boundary
Recall that
Dt ,
tZ
0
(avu
a (cv; l

v)  yvev) dv +
tZ
0
yvwvdv
+Et
24 TZ
t
(avu
r (cv; 1)  yvcv) dv
35 ;
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and its Snell Envelope is
Jt , sup
2S
Et [D ]
= sup
2S
Et
24 Z
0
(avu
a (cv; l

v)  yvev) dv +
Z
0
yvwvdv
+
TZ

(avu
r (cv; 1)  yvcv) dv
35 :
For log utility, we have
Dt =
tZ
0
 av

1

ln

yv
av

+
1  

ln (wv)  1  

ln

1  


+
1


dv
+y
tZ
0
vwvdv + Et
24 TZ
t
av

  ln

yv
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
+ ln ()  1

dv
35 ;
and
Jt = sup
2S
Et
24 Z
0
 av

1

ln

yv
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
+
1  

ln (wv)  1  

ln

1  


+
1


dv
+y
Z
0
vwvdv +
TZ

av

  ln

yv
av

+ ln ()  1

dv
35 :
We derived the following equation satised in the immediate retirement region R (t)
in Chapter 2,
Et
24 TZ
t
avu
a (cv; l

v) 1A(v)dv
35+ yEt
24 TZ
t
vwv1A(v)dv
35  yEt
24 TZ
t
ve

v1A(v)dv
35
 Et
24 TZ
t
avu
r (cv; 1) 1A(v)dv
35+ yEt
24 TZ
t
vc

v1A(v)dv
35 = 0: (3.1)
77
Next we nd the equation satised by the state variable xt 

yt
at
 1
w 1t in R (t) for
log utility.
Proposition 13. For log utility, in the immediate retirement region R (t), we have
xt

(  1) ln (wt) 

1

  

ln (xt) +K

P (t; T ; ;A)
+xt

1

  

F1 (t; T ; ;A) + 1  

F2 (t; T ; ;A)

= G (t; T ; 0; 1; 0;A) ;
where
K =

 ln () 

1  


ln

1  


+ f   

;
xt 

yt
at
 1
w 1t ;
P (t; T ; ;A) =
TZ
t
at;vEt

1A(v)

dv;
F1 (t; T ; ;A) = Et
24 TZ
t
at;v ln

t;v
at;v

1A(v)dv
35 ;
F2 (t; T ; ;A) = Et
24 TZ
t
at;v ln (wt;v) 1A(v)dv
35 ;
and
G (t; T ; 0; 1; 0;A) = Et
24 TZ
t
t;vwt;v1A(v)dv
35 :
Proof. For log utility, we have
avu
a (cv; l

v) =  av

1

ln

yv
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
+
1  

ln (wv)  1  

ln

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

;
avu
r (cv) = av ln (cv) = av

  ln

yv
av

+ ln ()

;
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thus
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

P (t; T ; ) ;
Et
24 TZ
t
avu
r (cv) dv
35
=  Et
24 TZ
t
av ln

yv
av

dv
35+  ln ()Et
24 TZ
t
avdv
35
=  atEt
24 TZ
t
at;v

ln

t;v
at;v

+ ln

yt
at

dv
35+ at ln ()Et
24 TZ
t
at;vdv
35
=  at

ln

yt
at

  ln ()

P (t; T ; )  atF1 (t; T ; ) ;
where
P (t; T ; ) = Et
24 TZ
t
at;vdv
35 = TZ
t
e (v t)dv =
1  e (T t)

;
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F1 (t; T ; ) = Et
24 TZ
t
at;v ln

t;v
at;v

dv
35 ;
and
F2 (t; T ; ) = Et
24 TZ
t
at;v ln (wt;v) dv
35 :
The components of the value function are
Et
24 TZ
t
ve

vdv
35 = Et
24 TZ
t
v

yv
av
 1
fdv
35
=
fat
y
Et
24 TZ
t
at;vdv
35 = fat
y
P (t; T ; ) ;
Et
24 TZ
t
vwvdv
35 = twtEt
24 TZ
t
t;vwt;vdv
35 = twtG (t; T ; 0; 1; 0) ;
Et
24 TZ
t
vc

vdv
35 = Et
24 TZ
t
v

yv
av
 1
dv
35
=
at
y
Et
24 TZ
t
at;vdv
35 = at
y
P (t; T ; ) :
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Therefore we have
 at

1

ln

yt
at

+
1  

ln (wt)

P (t; T ; ;A)
 at 1

F1 (t; T ; ;A)  at1  

F2 (t; T ; ;A)
+at

1  


ln

1  


P (t; T ; ;A)
+ytwtG (t; T ; 0; 1; 0;A)
 fatP (t; T ; ;A)
+at

ln

yt
at

  ln ()

P (t; T ; ;A) + atF1 (t; T ; ;A)
+atP (t; T ; ;A)
= 0:
Simplify,
at

1  

ln (wt) +

1

  

ln

yt
at

P (t; T ; ;A)
+at

1

  

F1 (t; T ; ;A) + 1  

F2 (t; T ; ;A)

+at

 ln () 

1  


ln

1  


+ f   

P (t; T ; ;A)
= ytwtG (t; T ; 0; 1; 0;A) :
Divided by ytwt on both sides, we get
xt

1  

ln (wt) 

1

  

ln (xtwt)

P (t; T ; ;A)
+xt

1

  

F1 (t; T ; ;A) + 1  

F2 (t; T ; ;A)

+xt

 ln () 

1  


ln

1  


+ f   

P (t; T ; ;A)
= G (t; T ; 0; 1; 0;A) ;
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or
xt

(  1) ln (wt) 

1

  

ln (xt) +K

P (t; T ; ;A)
+xt

1

  

F1 (t; T ; ;A) + 1  

F2 (t; T ; ;A)

= G (t; T ; 0; 1; 0;A) ;
where
K =

 ln () 

1  


ln

1  


+ f   

: 
The next lemma gives closed form expressions for conditional expectations of ran-
dom variables restricted to the event of retirement and their derivatives with respect
to the multiplier y. These expressions are used for the representation of the optimal
retirement boundary, the optimal wealth and the optimal portfolio. First we specify a
standing assumption that the immediate retirement region R (t) is up connected for the
state variable xt, then we can calculate the conditional expectations involving the event
fxt  Btg.
Assumption. The immediate retirement region R (t) is up connected for the state
variable xt.
Su¢ cient condition to satisfy this assumption is   1

. See Proposition A2 and its
proof in Appendix.
Lemma 14. The following formulas apply
P (t; T ; ;R) =
TZ
t
at;vEt

1R(v)

dv =
TZ
t
at;vN (d (xt; Bv; v; 0)) dv;
P (t; T ; ;A) =
TZ
t
at;vEt

1A(v)

dv =
TZ
t
at;vN ( d (xt; Bv; v; 0)) dv;
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F1 (t; T ; ;R)
=

   r   1
2
2
 TZ
t
at;v (v   t)N (d (xt; Bv; v; 0)) dv
 
TZ
t
at;v
p
v   tn ( d (xt; Bv; v; 0)) dv;
F1 (t; T ; ;A)
=

   r   1
2
2
 TZ
t
at;v (v   t)N ( d (xt; Bv; v; 0)) dv
+
TZ
t
at;v
p
v   tn ( d (xt; Bv; v; 0)) dv;
F2 (t; T ; ;R)
=

w  
1
2
2w
 TZ
t
at;v (v   t)N (d (xt; Bv; v; 0)) dv
+w
TZ
t
at;v
p
v   tn ( d (xt; Bv; v; 0)) dv;
F2 (t; T ; ;A)
=

w  
1
2
2w
 TZ
t
at;v (v   t)N ( d (xt; Bv; v; 0)) dv
 w
TZ
t
at;v
p
v   tn ( d (xt; Bv; v; 0)) dv;
@
@y
P (t; T ; ;R) =
TZ
t
at;vn (d (xt; Bv; v; 0))
1
x
p
v   t
 
@xt
@y
xt
 
@Bv
@y
Bv
!
dv:
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@
@y
P (t; T ; ;A) =
TZ
t
at;vn ( d (xt; Bv; v; 0)) 1
x
p
v   t
 
@Bv
@y
Bv
 
@xt
@y
xt
!
dv;
@
@y
F1 (t; T ; ;R)
=

   r   1
2
2


TZ
t
at;v
p
v   tn (d (xt; Bv; v; 0)) 1
x
 
@xt
@y
xt
 
@Bv
@y
Bv
!
dv
 
TZ
t
at;vn ( d (xt; Bv; v; 0)) d (xt; Bv; v; 0) 1
x
 
@Bv
@y
Bv
 
@xt
@y
xt
!
dv;
@
@y
F1 (t; T ; ;A)
=

   r   1
2
2


TZ
t
at;v
p
v   tn ( d (xt; Bv; v; 0)) 1
x
 
@Bv
@y
Bv
 
@xt
@y
xt
!
dv
+
TZ
t
at;vn ( d (xt; Bv; v; 0)) d (xt; Bv; v; 0) 1
x
 
@Bv
@y
Bv
 
@xt
@y
xt
!
dv;
@
@y
F2 (t; T ; ;R)
=

w  
1
2
2w


TZ
t
at;v
p
v   tn (d (xt; Bv; v; 0)) 1
x
 
@xt
@y
xt
 
@Bv
@y
Bv
!
dv
+w
TZ
t
at;vn ( d (xt; Bv; v; 0)) d (xt; Bv; v; 0) 1
x
 
@Bv
@y
Bv
 
@xt
@y
xt
!
dv:
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@
@y
F2 (t; T ; ;A)
=

w  
1
2
2w


TZ
t
at;v
p
v   tn ( d (xt; Bv; v; 0)) 1
x
 
@Bv
@y
Bv
 
@xt
@y
xt
!
dv
 w
TZ
t
at;vn ( d (xt; Bv; v; 0)) d (xt; Bv; v; 0) 1
x
 
@Bv
@y
Bv
 
@xt
@y
xt
!
dv:
Proof. See appendix. 
Now we can derive the backward recursive equation satised by the optimal retire-
ment boundary of the state variable xt.
Theorem 15. The boundary Bt satises
Bt

(  1) ln

w0

Bt
x0

exp (t)

 

1

  

ln (Bt) +K

(3.2)
PB (t; T ; ;A) +Bt

1

  

FB1 (t; T ; ;A) +
1  

FB2 (t; T ; ;A)

= GB (t; T ; 0; 1; 0;A) :
with limiting condition
BT

(  1) ln

w0

BT
x0

exp (T )

 

1

  

ln (BT ) +K

= 1;
where K =  ln ()  1 

ln

1 


+ f   ,  = w
x
,  = w   122w   
 
x   122x

and
PB (t; T ; ;A) , FB1 (t; T ; ;A) , FB2 (t; T ; ;A) , GB (t; T ; 0; 1; 0;A)
are the notations for
P (t; T ; ;A) , F1 (t; T ; ;A) , F2 (t; T ; ;A) , G (t; T ; 0; 1; 0;A)
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when substituting xt by Bt, respectively.
Proof. We derived that in the retirement region,
xt

(  1) ln (wt) 

1

  

ln (xt) +K

P (t; T ; ;A)
+xt

1

  

F1 (t; T ; ;A) + 1  

F2 (t; T ; ;A)

= G (t; T ; 0; 1; 0;A) :
For xt =

yt
at
 1
w 1t , we have
x =   +

r +
1
2
2

 

w  
1
2
2w

+
1
2
2x;
x =    w:
wt is a transform of xt,
wt = w0

xt
x0

exp (t) ;
where  = w
x
,  = w   122w   
 
x   122x

. Denote
P (t; T ; ;A) ; F1 (t; T ; ;A) ; F2 (t; T ; ;A) and G (t; T ; 0; 1; 0;A)
when substituting xt by Bt as
PB (t; T ; ;A) ; FB1 (t; T ; ;A) ; FB2 (t; T ; ;A) and GB (t; T ; 0; 1; 0;A)
respectively. Thus the boundary Bt satises
Bt

(  1) ln

w0

Bt
x0

exp (t)

 

1

  

ln (Bt) +K

PB (t; T ; ;A)
+Bt

1

  

FB1 (t; T ; ;A) +
1  

FB2 (t; T ; ;A)

= GB (t; T ; 0; 1; 0;A) :
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To derive the limiting condition for the boundary, let the integrand which is the instan-
taneous gain minus the instantaneous loss be equal to 0.
 avua (cv; lv) + avur (cv; 1)  yvwv + yvev   yvcv = 0;
av

1

ln

yv
av

+
1  

ln (wv)  1  

ln

1  


+av

  ln

yv
av

+ ln ()

  yvwv + fav   av = 0;
av

1

  

ln

yv
av

+
1  

ln (wv)

+av

 ln ()  1  

ln

1  


+ f   

  yvwv = 0;
xv

1

  

ln

yv
av

+
1  

ln (wv)

+xv

 ln ()  1  

ln

1  


+ f   

  1 = 0;
xv

 

1

  

ln (xvwv) +
1  

ln (wv) +K

= 1;
xv

(  1) ln (wv) 

1

  

ln (xv) +K

= 1:
Thus the limiting condition for the boundary is BT satises
BT

(  1) ln

w0

BT
x0

exp (T )

 

1

  

ln (BT ) +K

= 1: 
What is the relationship between the optimal retirement boundary of an individual
with log utility and the optimal retirement boundary of an individual with power utility?
Comment. In general, the optimal retirement boundary Bt of an individual with
log utility and the optimal retirement boundary Bt of an individual with power utility
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are di¤erent even if all parameters for the two individuals are the same, the initial
multipliers are the same and the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion converges to 1.
However, under the condition  = 1=, the two individuals will have the same optimal
retirement boundaries if all parameters for the two individuals are the same, the initial
multipliers are the same and the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion converges to 1.
Proof. We consider equation (3:1) satised within the retirement region which is used
to derive the optimal retirement boundaries for both individual with power utility and
individual with log utility. From the candidate solutions of ev and c

v, its straightforward
to see that if the multiplier y is the same, ev and c

v for power utility converges to e

v and
cv for log utility as R approaches to 1. u
a (cv; l

v) and u
r (cv; 1) for power utility do not
converge to ua (cv; l

v) and u
r (cv; 1) for log utility in general. However, if we subtract
1 from the numerators of both
ua (cv; l

v) =
 
(cv)
 (lv)
1 1 R
(1 R) and u
r (cv; 1) = 
(cv)
1 R
1 R ,
then they will converge to
ua (cv; l

v) =
1

( ln (cv) + (1  ) ln (lv)) and ur (cv; 1) =  ln (cv) ,
as R approaches to 1. Therefore, if  = 1=, then ua (cv; l

v) ur (cv; 1) for power utility
converges to ua (cv; l

v) ur (cv; 1) for log utility as R approaches to 1. Notice also that
the state variable we choose for log utility

yt
at
 1
w 1t is the limit of the state variable
for power utility

yt
at
  1
R
w
(1 ) 1
t as R approaches to 1. Therefore equation (3:1) for
power utility converges to equation (3:1) for log utility as R approaches to 1. With the
same state variable, the same backward recursive equation will be derived from equation
(3:1) if all parameters for the two individuals are the same, the initial multipliers are
the same and the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion converges to 1. 
Equation (3.2) is a backward recursive equation. The same algorithm as in the
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power utility case can be implemented to solve the equation. First use trapezoidal
rule to discretize the integrals and recursively solve the boundary starting from the
boundary condition. And at each time step, solve the nonlinear equation using Newton-
Raphson iteration. Next proposition gives the equation satised by the derivative of the
retirement boundary with respect to the multiplier y. @Bt
@y
is needed for the expressions
of the optimal wealth and the optimal portfolio.
Proposition 16. The derivative of the boundary @Bt
@y
satises
@Bt
@y

(  1) ln

w0

Bt
x0

exp (t)

 

1

  

ln (Bt) +K

PB (t; T ; ;A)
+Bt

(  1)  1
Bt
@Bt
@y
+ (  1)  1
y
 

1

  

1
Bt
@Bt
@y

PB (t; T ; ;A)
+
@Bt
@y

1

  

FB1 (t; T ; ;A) +
1  

FB2 (t; T ; ;A)

+Bt

(  1) ln

w0

Bt
x0

exp (t)

 

1

  

ln (Bt) +K

@
@y
PB (t; T ; ;A)
+Bt

1

  

@
@y
FB1 (t; T ; ;A) +
1  

@
@y
FB2 (t; T ; ;A)

  @
@y
GB (t; T ; 0; 1; 0;A)
= 0;
with boundary condition
@BT
@y
=
 BT (  1)  1y
(  1) ln  yw1+0 BT exp (T )   1    ln (BT ) +K + (  1)     1    :
Proof. See appendix. 
Figure 3.1 shows the convergence of the retirement boundary for power utility to the
retirement boundary for log utility as R approaches to 1, under the condition  = 1=,
all parameters for the two individuals are the same and the initial multipliers are the
same. Parameter values are chosen as the same in Table 2.1, except now we change 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Convergence of boundaries as R approaches 1
Log utility
R=1.01
R=1.04
R=1.1
R=1.25
R=2
Figure 31: This gure shows the convergence of the optimal retirement
boundaries of power utility to the optimal retirement boundary of log
utility.
to be 3=2, in order for it to be equal to 1=. The initial multiplier y is chosen to be
the same as derived in the numerical studies in Chapter 2, y = 0:7130688  10 14. The
boundary (red) at the bottom is the optimal retirement boundary for an individual with
log utility computed from Equation (3.2). All other boundaries are optimal retirement
boundaries for an individual with power utility for di¤erent coe¢ cients of relative risk
aversion R, computed from (2:10). As R approaches to 1, the boundaries of power
utility converges to the boundary of log utility. Figure 3.2 shows that the derivatives
of the optimal retirement boundaries @Bt
@y
of power utility converge to the derivative of
the optimal retirement boundary @Bt
@y
of log utility (red) as R approaches to 1. The
derivatives are computed by a more direct approach. Increase the multiplier y by a
small amount y, for this new multiplier y+ y, compute a new boundary Bt(y+ y).
The derivative is approximated by @Bt
@y
 (Bt(y + y) Bt(y)) =y.
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Figure 32: This gure shows that the derivatives of the optimal retire-
ment boundaries @Bt
@y
of power utility converge to the derivative of the
optimal retirement boundary @Bt
@y
of log utility.
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3.4 Optimal liquid wealth
The closed form expression of the optimal liquid wealth is derived in the next theorem.
Theorem 17. Before retirement, the optimal liquid wealth Xt satises
Xt
=  1t Et
264 

tZ
t
ve

vdv  
tZ
t
vwvdv +
TZ
t
vc

vdv
375
=  1t

at
1

1
y
P (t; T ; ;A)  twtG (t; T ; 0; 1; 0;A) + at
1
y
P (t; T ; ;R) (3.3)
+at

1

ln

yt
at

+
1  

ln (wt) 

1  


ln

1  


+
1


@
@y
P (t; T ; ;A)
+at
1

@
@y
F1 (t; T ; ;A) + at1  

@
@y
F2 (t; T ; ;A)  ytwt
@
@y
G (t; T ; 0; 1; 0;A)
 at

  ln

yt
at

+ ln ()  1

@
@y
P (t; T ; ;R) + at @
@y
F1 (t; T ; ;R)

:
After retirement, the liquid wealth is
Xt = 
 1
t Et
24 TZ
t
vc

vdv
35 =  1t Et
24 TZ
t
v

yv
av
 1
dv
35
= 

yt
at
 1
1  exp( (T   t))

:
Proof. For log utility, we have
Dt =
tZ
0
 av

1

ln

yv
av

+
1  

ln (wv)  1  

ln

1  


+
1


dv
+y
tZ
0
vwvdv + Et
24 TZ
t
av

  ln

yv
av

+ ln ()  1

dv
35 ;
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and
Jt  sup
2S
Et [D ]
= sup
2S
Et
24 Z
0
 av

1

ln

yv
av

+
1  

ln (wv)  1  

ln

1  


+
1


dv
+y
Z
0
vwvdv +
TZ

av

  ln

yv
av

+ ln ()  1

dv
35 :
Denote
Lt  Jt   Et
24 tZ
0
 av

1

ln

yv
av

+
1  

ln (wv)  1  

ln

1  


+
1


dv
+
tZ
0
yvwvdv
35 :
Thus
Lt = Et
24 tZ
t
 av

1

ln

yv
av

+
1  

ln (wv)  1  

ln

1  


+
1


dv
+
tZ
t
yvwvdv +
TZ
t
av

  ln

yv
av

+ ln ()  1

dv
375 ;
where  t is the optimal stopping time. Liquid wealth Xt satises
tXt = Et
264 

tZ
t
ve

vdv  
tZ
t
vwvdv +
TZ
t
vc

vdv
375 :
Plug in the values of ev and c

v,
tXt = Et
264 

tZ
t
fav
y
dv  
tZ
t
vwvdv +
TZ
t
av
y
dv
375 :
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Lt is a convex function of y. Therefore,
@Lt
@y
= Et
264 

tZ
t
 fav
y
dv +
tZ
t
vwvdv  
TZ
t
av
y
dv
375
i.e. @Lt
@y
=  tXt is satised. Use Early Exercise Premium representation to write Lt as
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the following
Lt
= Et
24 tZ
t
 av

1

ln

yv
av

+
1  

ln (wv)  1  

ln

1  


+
1


dv
+
tZ
t
yvwvdv +
TZ
t
av

  ln

yv
av

+ ln ()  1

dv
375
= Et
24 TZ
t
 av

1

ln

yv
av

+
1  

ln (wv)  1  

ln

1  


+
1


dv
+
TZ
t
yvwvdv
35
 Et
24 TZ
t
 av

1
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)  1
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
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+
1


1A(v)dv
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yvwv1A(v)dv +
TZ
t
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
  ln

yv
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+ ln ()  1

1R(v)dv
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=  at

1

ln

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at

+
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ln (wt)  1  

ln

1  
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+
1


P (t; T ; ;A)
 at 1

F1 (t; T ; ;A)  at1  
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F2 (t; T ; ;A) + ytwtG (t; T ; 0; 1; 0;A)
+at

  ln

yt
at

+ ln ()  1

P (t; T ; ;R)  atF1 (t; T ; ;R) :
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Therefore,
tXt =  
@Lt
@y
= at
1

1
y
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;A)  twtG (t; T ; 0; 1; 0;A) + at
1
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+at
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 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
yt
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P (t; T ; ;R) + at @
@y
F1 (t; T ; ;R) ;
and the optimal liquid wealth Xt is
Xt
=  1t

at
1

1
y
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;A)  twtG (t; T ; 0; 1; 0;A) + at
1
y
P (t; T ; ;R)
+at
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
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
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at

+
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;A) + at1  

@
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 at
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  ln
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yt
at
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+ ln ()  1

@
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P (t; T ; ;R) + at @
@y
F1 (t; T ; ;R)

: 
Before retirement, the optimal liquid wealth Xt of an individual with log utility is
the limit of the liquid wealth of an individual with power utility when the coe¢ cient
of relative risk aversion R approaches 1, if the optimal retirement boundaries Bt are
the same, and the corresponding parameters and the initial multipliers for the two
individuals are the same. The reason is in the representation of liquid wealth,
tXt = Et
264 

tZ
t
ve

vdv  
tZ
t
vwvdv +
TZ
t
vc

vdv
375 ;
as R approaches 1, ev, c

v and the state variable xt of power utility all converge to those
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of log utility. The optimal stopping time  t are the same if the boundaries are the
same. After retirement, convergence results hold for the optimal liquid wealth when R
approaches 1, as long as the multipliers for the two individuals are the same.
Theorem 18. If   1

or avua (cv; l

v)  avur (cv; 1), retirement is optimal when the
liquid wealth crosses its boundary, i.e.,
Xt  y 1 w 0 at exp ( t)
1  exp( (T   t))

B
 
t : (3.4)
where  =
 
x
,  =  r   122   
 
x   122x

and Bt is the boundary for the state
variable xt.
Proof. The liquid wealth before retirement is
Xt = 
 1
t Et
264 

tZ
t
ve

vdv  
tZ
t
vwvdv +
TZ
t
vc

vdv
375 ;
where  t is the optimal stopping time. Plug in the values of e

v and c

v,
Xt = 
 1
t Et
264 

tZ
t
fav
y
dv  
tZ
t
vwvdv +
TZ
t
av
y
dv
375 :
The liquid wealth after retirement is
Xt = Et
24 TZ
t
t;vc

vdv
35 = Et
24 TZ
t
t;v

yv
av
 1
dv
35
=  1t Et
24 TZ
t
av
y
dv
35 :
Next we show that the boundary of the term  1t Et
hR T
t
av
y
dv
i
is exactly the retirement
boundary of the liquid wealth. It su¢ ces to show that the liquid wealth before retirement
is less than or equal to the value of  1t Et
hR T
t
av
y
dv
i
. This is to show, at time t before
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retirement,
Xt;b   1t Et
264 

tZ
t
fav
y
dv  
tZ
t
vwvdv +
TZ
t
av
y
dv
375
 Xt;a   1t Et
24 TZ
t
av
y
dv
35 ;
or
Et
24 tZ
t
fav
y
dv  
tZ
t
vwvdv  
tZ
t
av
y
dv
35  0:
One su¢ cient condition for the above inequality is f     0, or   1

. Notice   1

is also a su¢ cient condition for the retirement region to be up-connected. To derive
another su¢ cient condition, consider the optimal value function, which is
Lt = Et
24 tZ
t
 av

1

ln

yv
av

+
1  

ln (wv)  1  

ln

1  


+
1


dv
+
tZ
t
yvwvdv +
TZ
t
av

  ln

yv
av

+ ln ()  1

dv
375 ;
thus we have
Lt = Et
24 tZ
t
 av

1

ln

yv
av

+
1  

ln (wv)  1  

ln

1  


dv
+
TZ
t
av

  ln

yv
av

+ ln ()

dv
375  ytXt;b;
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and
Lt  Et
24 TZ
t
av

  ln

yv
av

+ ln ()  1

dv
35
= Et
24 TZ
t
av

  ln

yv
av

+ ln ()

dv
35  ytXt;a:
Therefore
Et
24 tZ
t
 av

1

ln

yv
av

+
1  

ln (wv)  1  

ln

1  


dv
+
TZ
t
av

  ln

yv
av

+ ln ()

dv
375  ytXt;b
 Et
24 TZ
t
av

  ln

yv
av

+ ln ()

dv
35  ytXt;a:
Su¢ cient condition to derive Xt;b  Xt;a is
 av

1

ln

yv
av

+
1  

ln (wv)  1  

ln

1  


 av

  ln

yv
av

+ ln ()

;
i.e., avua (cv; l

v)  avur (cv; 1). Next we compute the form of the boundary of the liquid
wealth.
Xt;a = 
 1
t Et
24 TZ
t
av
y
dv
35 :
t is a transform of xt,
t =

xt
x0

exp (t) ;
where  =
 
x
,  =  r   122   
 
x   122x

, x0 = y 1w 10 and
x =   +

r +
1
2
2

 

w  
1
2
2w

+
1
2
2x;
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x =    w:
Therefore the boundary of the liquid wealth is

Bt
x0
 
exp ( t)Et
24 TZ
t
av
y
dv
35
= y 1 w
 
0 at exp ( t)
1  exp( (T   t))

B
 
t : 
By inspection of the optimal boundary of liquid wealth for an individual with log
utility (3:4) and the optimal boundary of liquid wealth for an individual with power
utility (2:16), we nd that the former is the limit of the latter when the coe¢ cient of
relative risk aversion approaches to 1, if the optimal retirement boundaries Bt are the
same, and the corresponding parameters and the initial multipliers of the two individuals
are the same.
3.5 Optimal consumption, optimal labor and optimal expendi-
ture
The optimal consumption, the optimal leisure and the optimal expenditure are as follows.
Before retirement,
cv = 

yv
av
 1
f; lv = (1  )

yv
av
 1
f
1
wv
;
ev = c

v + l

vwv =

yv
av
 1
f;
after retirement,
cv =

yv
av
 1
;
where f = 1=, and the multiplier y satises equation (3.3) at time 0. Optimal labor
is the di¤erence between the maximal amount of labor h endowed (normalized to be 1)
100
and the optimal leisure lv, i.e., h

v = 1  lv.
Consumption is inversely related to state price density v and its volatility is equal
to the market price of risk . For leisure, it is inversely related to vwv and it has
volatility    w. For empirically reasonable estimates of  and w,    w is positive
and the consumption and leisure volatility is much higher for the case of log utility
than the case of power utility. In a state where the stock market experiences a positive
shock, its optimal to consume more and have more leisure (if assume    w > 0).
After retirement, consumption volatility is . When the wage is deterministic, w = 0,
consumption volatility before and after retirement and leisure volatility are all equal to
, which is a very high volatility.
As in the case of power utility, the optimal consumption, the optimal leisure and
the optimal expenditure are increasing with respect to the initial wealth. When initial
wealth is higher, the multiplier y becomes smaller, which results in higher consumption,
leisure and total expenditure.
 is the measure of relative weight of consumption and labor. In the total expenditure
ev, the percentage that the individual spends on consumption is , and the percentage
that the individual spends on leisure is 1    with opportunity cost being the wage
wv. The larger the value of , the larger the percentage spent on consumption and the
smaller the percentage spent on leisure.
 is the coe¢ cient that measures the relative weight of the retirement phase, and it
also controls the disruption of the consumption when the individual enters the retirement
phase. The disruption is measured by the ratio of the consumption immediately after
retirement and the consumption just before retirement . Note that if  is greater than
1, optimal consumption for an individual with log utility jumps to a higher level at the
moment when the individual retires.
The optimal consumption, the optimal leisure and the optimal expenditure of an
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individual with log utility are the limits of the optimal consumption, the optimal leisure
and the optimal expenditure of an individual with power utility when the coe¢ cient of
relative risk aversion R converges to 1, provided that the two individuals have the same
initial Lagrange multiplier y.
3.6 Optimal portfolio
Theorem 19. Before retirement, the optimal portfolio t satises
t
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
:
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We have t = 1t + 2t, where
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;
and
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:
1t is the mean-variance hedge, and 2t is the hedge against uctuations in wages. And
g1 =  
TZ
t
at;vn ( d (xt; Bv; v; 0)) 1
x
p
v   tdv;
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After retirement, the optimal portfolio is t =  1

yt
at
 1
1 exp( (T t))

.
Proof. Apply Clark-Ocone formula to the right hand side in equation (3.3) and equate
the volatility on both sides. 
Before retirement, the optimal portfolio of an individual with log utility is the limit
of the optimal portfolio of an individual with power utility when the coe¢ cient of rela-
tive risk aversion R approaches to 1, if the optimal retirement boundaries of the state
variables are the same, and the corresponding parameters and the initial multipliers of
the two individuals are the same. The reason is that under these conditions, the wealth
processes are equal when R approaches 1. After retirement, convergence results hold
for the optimal portfolio when R approaches 1, as long as the multipliers for the two
individuals are the same.
Part II
Asset liability management with
optimal liquidation
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Chapter 4
Asset liability management for dened
benet pension plans: optimal liquidation
and asset allocation policies
4.1 Introduction
For a dened benet pension fund, of which the asset-liability management involves the
choices of dividend-contribution, risk-reward and continuation-liquidation, we investi-
gate the behavior of the optimal policies.
Trillions of dollars of dened benet pension asset have been accumulated over the
years. However, management of these assets is not the comparative advantage of cor-
porations. The pension fund faces a stream of intermediate liability and a terminal
liability, which are benet payments to the pension plan participants. The value and
the risk of this liability side of the balance sheet of a pension fund, are crucial for its
optimal asset allocation of pension asset. In other words, the whole balance sheet of
the pension fund should be taken into consideration for optimal policies. An asset al-
location strategy focusing exclusively on the pension asset while neglecting either the
intermediate liability or the terminal liability, is bound to be suboptimal. Moreover,
every time the economy experiences a severe recession, both sides of the balance sheet
of dened benet pension fund will normally be hit. The fall of stock prices reduces the
value of the assets and the fall of interest rates increases the value of the liability. The
resulting shortfall in the pension fund severely disrupts the normal business operation
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of the fund sponsor. Many rms start to switch from dened benet pension plan to
dened contribution plan so as to transfer this risk which is not related to their core
business to the employees. In light of these challenges, we study a model of optimal
dividend-contribution, portfolio and liquidation from the viewpoint of a dened benet
pension fund.
Relatively limited attention has been devoted to applying the theory of dynamic op-
timal asset allocation to study asset-liability management, in spite of the large amount
of dened benet pension asset accumulated over the years currently under manage-
ment. Boulier et al. (1995), Cairns (2000), Rudolf and Ziemba (2004), Detemple and
Rindisbacher (2008), Detemple et al. (2010) and Van Binsbergen and Brandt (2012) are
examples of recent contributions in the asset-liability management for dened benet
pension fund literature. A key di¤erence in modeling among these papers is in the ob-
jective function of the fund sponsor. Boulier et al. (1995) minimize the disutility which
is a power function of contributions from the sponsor to the pension fund. Cairns (2000)
extends to general loss function and derives optimal policies for power and exponential
loss function. Other papers follow the tradition of Merton (1971). Rudolf and Ziemba
(2004) study an intertemporal model where utility is dened on surplus of pension assets
over liabilities. In Van Binsbergen and Brandt (2012), the sponsors utility is a power
function of the funding ratio at terminal date, penalized by the stream of contributions.
Detemple and Rindisbacher (2008) consider a model where preference of the sponsor is
dened over intermediate dividends and terminal excess of pension asset over a fraction
of liabilities, and this preference formulation is suitable to model the case when there is
a funding shortfall from the full liability at the terminal date. Detemple et al. (2010)
develop a model where the fund sponsors utility is derived from dividends or contribu-
tions, depending on if outlay from the fund is higher than or lower than the liability.
This preference structure has the advantage that optimal dividends and contributions
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are jointly determined and it also captures the feature that contributions in excess of
a threshold that might hurt the normal business of the sponsor are not tolerated. We
extend Detemple et al. (2010) to incorporate endogenous optimal liquidation in the
asset-liability management model. The optimal liquidation date, or the optimal date
to switch from a dened benet pension plan to a dened contribution pension plan,
is modeled as an optimal stopping time chosen by the fund sponsor. The liquidation
date of the pension fund is the terminal date of the investment horizon, and the sponsor
cares about the lump sum amount of dividend or contribution at this date.
We derive the recursive integral equation of the optimal liquidation boundary for
an endogenous variable, which is related to the terminal liability and the state price
density. We provide closed-form solutions of the optimal net cash ow (dividends or
contributions), the optimal liquid wealth and the optimal portfolio. As in the indi-
viduals life-cycle problem, early exercise premium representation a¤ords interesting
interpretations in terms of net local gains from early liquidation or delayed liquidation.
Optimal net cash ows are shown to be positive (dividends) when state price density is
su¢ ciently low and be negative (contributions) when state price density is su¢ ciently
high. We also derive the liquidation boundary for the pension assets and identify in the
optimal portfolio the hedges against uctuations in the intermediate liability and in the
terminal liability.
4.2 The model
(
;F ; P ) is a complete probability space. Wt, t 2 [0; T ] is a Brownian motion on the
probability space. The ow of information Ft, t 2 [0; T ] is the ltration generated by
Wt.
The market consists of a riskless asset and a risky asset. Riskless asset is a money
market account with a constant interest rate r > 0. Risky asset has instantaneous
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return dRt which satises dRt = dt+ dWt.  is the expected rate of return,  is the
volatility of the return.  and  are both constants and positive. The market price of
risk is  = (  r) =. The state price density process is t = exp
  rt  1
2
2t  Wt

.
This structure implies that the Brownian motion risk is hedgeable, thus the market is
complete and there are no arbitrage opportunities.
The sponsor faces a stream of intermediate liability and a terminal liability. Inter-
mediate liability of the pension fund at time t is lt and lt satises dlt = lt (ldt+ ldWt),
where l is the expected growth rate of the intermediate liability and l is the volatility
of the growth rate. Terminal liability is LT and Lt satises dLt = Lt (Ldt+ LdWt),
where L is the expected growth rate of the terminal liability and L is the volatility of
the growth rate. The sponsors contribution at time t is pt and terminal contribution is
PT . Dividend paid out from the fund to the sponsor at time t are dt and terminal divi-
dend are DT . Liquid wealth in the fund is Xt. ct is the amount withdrawn from (when
positive) or injected in (when negative) the portfolio. Dene intermediate net cash ow
ft  dt pt and terminal net cash ow FT  DT  PT . Accounting balance ensures that
at any time t, ct = dt + lt   pt. If ct  lt, net cash ow ft = dt = ct   lt and pt = 0, net
cash ow is in the form of dividend; if ct < lt, net cash ow ft =  pt = ct  lt and dt = 0,
net cash ow is in the form of contribution. At terminal time T , XT = DT + LT   PT .
If XT  LT , FT = DT = XT   LT and PT = 0; if XT < LT , FT =  PT = XT   LT
and DT = 0. Let t be the dollar amount invested in the risky asset. Liquid wealth Xt
satises
dXt = (Xt   t) rdt  ctdt+ t (dt+ dWt)
= (rXt   ct) dt+ t (dt+ dWt) ;
starting from X0 = x.
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Preference ordering for the sponsor is represented by Von Neumann-Morgenstein
expected utility.
U = E
24 Z
0
avu (fv + glv; lv; v) dv + aU (F + sL ; L ; )
35 ;
where
u (fv + glv; lv; v) =
(fv + glv)
1 R
1 R , U (F + sL ; L ; ) =
(F + sL )
1 R
1 R
and av = exp ( v). R is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion.  is the subjective
discount rate.  is the liquidation date chosen by the sponsor.  2 S, where S is the
collection of stopping times with values in [0; T ]. Preference of the sponsor is dened
over net cash ow (dividends or contributions) depending on whether outlay from the
fund is higher than or lower than the liability. The formulations of the intermediate
utility and the terminal utility ensure, as derived in the optimal policy below, that the
intermediate contribution is limited to threshold glv and the terminal contribution is
limited to threshold sL . This allows us to model that large contributions to the fund
in excess of the threshold which harm the normal business operations are not allowed.
Since the intermediate liability is usually much smaller than the terminal liability, we
assume that g  1 and s  1, i.e., the intermediate contributions to the fund can be a
multiple of the intermediate liability, but the terminal contribution is limited to only a
fraction of the terminal liability.
4.3 Pure optimal stopping problem
The policy is said to be admissible: (f; F; ) 2 A, if no-bankruptcy condition is satised,
i.e., liquid wealth is nonnegative. Thus (f; F; ) is admissible if Xt  0. Static budget
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constraint is
E
24 Z
0
v (fv + lv) dv +  (F + L )
35  x: (4.1)
The optimization problem can be reduced to maximizing U subject to the static
budget constraint.
Lemma 20. If (f; F; ) is admissible, then (f; F ) satises the static budget constraint
(4:1). If (f; F ) satises the static budget constraint (4:1), then 9 , such that (f; F; )
is admissible.
Proof. See Appendix. 
The maximization problem is now
V (x) = sup
2S; (f;F;)2A
E
24 Z
0
avu (fv + glv; lv; v) dv + aU (F + sL ; L ; )
35 ;
subject to
E
24 Z
0
v (fv + lv) dv +  (F + L )
35  x:
Recall the Legendre-Fenchel transform of utility function and inequality (2:4). Choose
x0 = fv, y0 = ya 1v v and U(x0) = u (fv + glv; lv; v) in (2:4), we have
u (fv + glv; lv; v)  eu(ya 1v v) + ya 1v vfv;
or
avu (fv + glv; lv; v)  aveu(ya 1v v) + yvfv:
Choose x0 = F , y0 = ya 1  and U(x0) = U (F + sL ; L ; ) in (2:4), we have
U (F + sL ; L ; )  eU(ya 1  ) + ya 1 F ;
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or
aU (F + sL ; L ; )  a eU(ya 1  ) + yF :
Therefore,
E
24 Z
0
avu (fv + glv; lv; v) dv + aU (F + sL ; L ; )
35
 E
24 Z
0
aveu(ya 1v v)dv + a eU(ya 1  )
35
+yE
24 Z
0
vfvdv +
TZ

Fdv
35
= E
24 Z
0
 
aveu(ya 1v v)  yvlv dv + a eU(ya 1  )  yL
35
+yE
24 Z
0
(vfv + vlv) dv + F + L
35
 E
24 Z
0
 
aveu(ya 1v v)  yvlv dv + a eU(ya 1  )  yL
35+ yx:
Dene
eJ (y; ) , E
24 Z
0
 
aveu(ya 1v v)  yvlv dv + a eU(ya 1  )  yL
35 :
Thus we have
E
24 Z
0
avu (fv + glv; lv; v) dv + aU (F + sL ; L ; )
35  inf
y>0
h eJ (y; ) + yxi ;
and
V (x)  sup
2S
inf
y>0
h eJ (y; ) + yxi :
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Dene
eV (y) , sup
2S
eJ (y; )
= sup
2S
E
24 Z
0
 
aveu(ya 1v v)  yvlv dv + a eU(ya 1  )  yL
35 :
Therefore, we have
V (x)  sup
2S
inf
y>0
h eJ (y; ) + yxi  inf
y>0

sup
2S
eJ (y; ) + yx = inf
y>0
heV (y) + yxi :
The next proposition uses the same technique as in Chapter 2 to show that the inequality
above is actually an equality. Therefore we can rst solve the pure optimal stopping
problem of eV (y), while treating y as a constant.
Proposition 21.
V (x) = inf
y>0
heV (y) + yxi :
Proof. We have
u (fv + glv; lv; v) =
(fv + glv)
1 R
1 R ;
and
U (F + sL ; L ; ) =
(F + sL )
1 R
1 R :
First order conditions are
avuf (fv + glv; lv; v) = av (fv + glv)
 R = yv;
aUF (F + sL ; L ; ) = a (F + sL )
 R = y :
Calculation gives the following solutions
f v =

yv
av
  1
R
  glv;
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F  =

y
a
  1
R
  sL :
Now we have
aveu(ya 1v v) = avu (f v + glv; lv; v)  yvf v
=
1
1 Rav

yv
av
1  1
R
  yv
 
yv
av
  1
R
  glv
!
=
R
1 Ra
1
R
v (yv)
 + yvglv:
aveu(ya 1v v) is a convex function of y.
a eU(ya 1  ) = aU (F  + sL ; L ; )  yF 
=
1
1 Ra

y
a
1  1
R
  y
 
y
a
  1
R
  sL
!
=
R
1 Ra
1
R
 (y )
 + ysL :
a eU(ya 1  ) is a convex function of y.
eJ (y; ) = E
24 Z
0
 
aveu(ya 1v v)  yvlv dv + a eU(ya 1  )  yL
35
= E
24 Z
0

R
1 Ra
1
R
v (yv)
 + yvglv   yvlv

dv
+
R
1 Ra
1
R
 (y )
 + ysL   yL

:
eJ (y; ) is also a convex function of y. For any given  2 S and a given y, dene
x (y) , E
24 Z
0
v (f

v + lv) dv +  (F

 + L )
35 :
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Plug in the values of f v and F

 ,
x (y) = E
24 Z
0
v
 
yv
av
  1
R
  glv + lv
!
dv + 
 
y
a
  1
R
  sL + L
!35
= E
24 Z
0

a
1
R
v y
  1
R v   vglv + vlv

dv + a
1
R
 y
  1
R    sL + L
35 :
Denote the stopping time that attains the supremum in eV (y) = sup
2S
eJ (y; ) by  y, i.e.,eV (y) = eJ  y;  y. We have eV 0(y) =  xy (y) and V (x) = infy>0 heV (y) + yxi. 
4.4 Optimal liquidation boundary
Now the problem is a pure optimal stopping problem
eV (y)
= sup
2S
E
24 Z
0
 
aveu(ya 1v v)  yvlv dv + a eU(ya 1  )  yL
35
= sup
2S
E
24 Z
0
(avu (f

v + glv; lv; v)  yvf v   yvlv) dv
+aU (F

 + sL ; L ; )  yF    yL]:
Let
Dt
,
tZ
0
(avu (f

v + glv; lv; v)  yvf v   yvlv) dv
+atU (F

t + sLt; Lt; t)  ytF t   ytLt;
116
and the Snell Envelope of Dt is
Jt
, sup
2S
Et [D ]
= sup
2S
Et
24 Z
0
(avu (f

v + glv; lv; v)  yvf v   yvlv) dv
+aU (F

 + sL ; L ; )  yF    yL]:
Jt has the following representation.
Proposition 22.
Jt = J
n
t + J
a
t ;
where
Jnt
= Et
24 TZ
0
(avu (f

v + glv; lv; v)  yvf v   yvlv) dv
+aTU (F

T + sLT ; LT ; T )  yTF T   yTLT];
Jat
=  Et
24 TZ
t
(avu (f

v + glv; lv; v)  yvf v   yvlv) 1R(v)dv
35
 Et
24 TZ
t
1R(v)d (avU (F v + sLv; Lv; v)  yvF v   yvLv)
35 :
and R (v) is the immediate liquidation region at time v.
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Proof. The same proof as in Proposition 3.
Jt = Et [JT ]  Et
24 TZ
t
1fv=vgdDv
35
= Jnt + J
a
t ;
where Jnt = Et [JT ] and J
a
t =  Et
hR T
t
1fv=vgdDv
i
. 
In the early exercise premium representation of Jt, Jnt is the value of Jt when the
optimal liquidation date is the terminal date T and Jat is the early liquidation premium.
The net local gain from early liquidation is
 avu (f v + glv; lv; v) + yvf v + yvlv   d (avU (F v + sLv; Lv; v)  yvF v   yvLv) :
yvf

v , yvlv, yvF

v and yvLv are transformations form monetary terms to utility terms
by the marginal cost yv.  avu (f v + glv; lv; v) represents instantaneous utility loss
upon early liquidation. yvf

v and yvlv represent the utility loss from intermediate
net cash ow and intermediate liability avoided by the sponsor from early liquidation.
avU (F

v + sLv; Lv; v)   yvF v   yvLv is the net utility gain at the liquidation date.
 d (avU (F v + sLv; Lv; v)  yvF v   yvLv) represents the possible appreciation in the
net utility gain forgone or the possible depreciation in the net utility gain avoided by
the sponsor upon early liquidation. The pension fund will never be liquidated prior to
T if
 avu (f v + glv; lv; v) + yvf v + yvlv   d (avU (F v + sLv; Lv; v)  yvF v   yvLv)  0,
for all v 2 [0; T ].
Delayed exercise premium representation gives the following proposition that em-
phasizes the local gains from delaying liquidation.
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Proposition 23.
Jt = Dt + J
d
t ;
where Dt is the immediate liquidation value function
Dt
=
tZ
0
(avu (f

v + glv; lv; v)  yvf v   yvlv) dv
+atU (F

t + sLt; Lt; t)  ytF t   ytLt;
and the delayed liquidition premium is
Jdt = Et
24 TZ
t
(avu (f

v + glv; lv; v)  yvf v   yvlv) 1fv<vgdv
35
+Et
24 TZ
t
d (atU (F

t + sLt; Lt; t)  ytF t   ytLt) 1fv<vgdv
35 :
Proof. As in Proposition 4,
Jdt = Et

Dt  Dt

= Et
24 TZ
t
(avu (f

v + glv; lv; v)  yvf v   yvlv) 1fv<vgdv
35
+Et
24 TZ
t
d (atU (F

t + sLt; Lt; t)  ytF t   ytLt) 1fv<vgdv
35 : 
The net local gains from delaying retirement is
avu (f

v + glv; lv; v)  yvf v   yvlv + d (avU (F v + sLv; Lv; v)  yvF v   yvLv) :
avu (f

v + glv; lv; v) represents instantaneous utility gain from delaying liquidation.
 yvf v and  yvlv represent the utility loss from intermediate net cash ow and
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intermediate liability incurred by the sponsor from delaying liquidation.
d (avU (F

v + sLv; Lv; v)  yvF v   yvLv) represents the possible appreciation in the
net utility gain collected or the possible depreciation in the net utility gain incurred by
the sponsor from delaying liquidation.
Now we specify a standing assumption that the immediate liquidation region R (t)
is up connected for the state variable xt = a
1
R
t (yt)
  1
R L 1t , this assumption is used
to calculate the conditional expectations of random variables restricted to the event of
liquidation fxt  Btg.
Assumption. The immediate liquidation region R (t) is up connected for the state
variable xt.
Su¢ cient conditions to satisfy this assumption are l  =R, L < =R and  r +
L   L  0. See Proposition A3 and its proof in Appendix. In the case that the
liquidation region is down connected under the conditions l  =R, L > =R and
 r + L   L  0, only a change of the term d (xt; Bv; v;C (; )) to its opposite
 d (xt; Bv; v;C (; )) is needed to derive the formulas under this case. See the derivation
of the conditional expectations of random variables restricted to fxt  Btg in proof of
Lemma 6 in Appendix.
The next theorem gives the backward recursive equation satised by the optimal
liquidation boundary.
Theorem 24. The optimal liquidation boundary Bt satises the following backward
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recursive equation
R
1 RBtG
B (t; T ; ; ; 1;A) (4.2)
+ (g   1) l0L 10 y

R exp (t)Bt G
B (l; t; T ; 0; 1; 0;A)
+
R
1 RBt exp ( A (; ; 1) (T   t)) + (s  1) exp ( A (L; 0; 1; 0) (T   t))
 

R
1 RBt + s  1

+A (; ; 1)
R
1 RBtG
B (t; T ; ; ; 1;R)
  (L   r   L) (s  1)GB (L; t; T ; 0; 1; 0;R)
= 0:
with limiting condition of the boundary BT that satises
(g   1) z0

BT
x0

exp (T ) +
R
1 RBT (1  A (; ; 1))
+ (s  1) (L   r   L)
= 0;
where
G (l; t; T ; ; ; )  Et
24 TZ
t
a
1
R
t;v

t;vl
(1 )
t;v dv
35 ;
G (L; t; T ; ; ; )  Et
24 TZ
t
a
1
R
t;v

t;vL
(1 )
t;v dv
35 ;
and GB() is the representation of G() when substituting xt by Bt. The coe¢ cients 
and  are
 =
z
x
,  = z  
1
2
2z   

x  
1
2
2x

,
where
x =  

R
+
1
R

r +
1
2
2

  L +
1
2
2L +
1
2
2x;
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x =

R
  L;
z = l  
1
2
2l   L +
1
2
2L +
1
2
2z;
z = l   L:
Proof. When  t = t, immediate liquidation value function is
Dt =
tZ
0
(avu (f

v + glv; lv; v)  yvf v   yvlv) dv
+atU (F

t + sLt; Lt; t)  ytF t   ytLt:
In the immediate liquidation regionR (t), Jt = Jnt +Jat = Dt. Plug in the representations
of Jnt , J
a
t and Dt, we get
Et
24 TZ
0
(avu (f

v + glv; lv; v)  yvf v   yvlv) dv
+aTU (F

T + sLT ; LT ; T )  yTF T   yTLT]
 Et
24 TZ
t
(avu (f

v + glv; lv; v)  yvf v   yvlv) 1R(v)dv
35
 Et
24 TZ
t
1R(v)d (avU (F v + sLv; Lv; v)  yvF v   yvLv)
35
=
tZ
0
(avu (f

v + glv; lv; v)  yvf v   yvlv) dv
+atU (F

t + sLt; Lt; t)  ytF t   ytLt:
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Simplifying,
Et
24 TZ
t
(avu (f

v + glv; lv; v)  yvf v   yvlv) 1A(v)dv
35
+Et [aTU (F

T + sLT ; LT ; T )  yTF T   yTLT ]
  (atU (F t + sLt; Lt; t)  ytF t   ytLt)
 Et
24 TZ
t
1R(v)d (avU (F v + sLv; Lv; v)  yvF v   yvLv)
35
= 0:
Plug in the values of f v and F
,
Et
24 TZ
t

R
1 Ra
1
R
v (yv)
 + yvglv   yvlv

1A(v)dv
35
+Et

R
1 Ra
1
R
T (yT )
 + yT sLT   yTLT

 

R
1 Ra
1
R
t (yt)
 + ytsLt   ytLt

 Et
24 TZ
t
1R(v)d

R
1 Ra
1
R
v (yv)
 + yvsLv   yvLv
35
= 0:
We have
Et
24 TZ
t
R
1 Ra
1
R
v (yv)
 dv
35 = R
1 Ra
1
R
t (yt)
Et
24 TZ
t
a
1
R
t;v

t;vdv
35
=
R
1 Ra
1
R
t (yt)
G (t; T ; ; ; 1) ;
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Et
24 TZ
t
(g   1) yvlvdv
35 = (g   1) ytltEt
24 TZ
t
t;vlt;vdv
35
= (g   1) ytltG (l; t; T ; 0; 1; 0) ;
Et

R
1 Ra
1
R
T (yT )
 + yT sLT   yTLT

=
R
1 Ra
1
R
t (yt)
Et
h
a
1
R
t;T 

t;T
i
+ (s  1) ytLtEt

t;TLt;T

=
R
1 Ra
1
R
t (yt)
 exp ( A (; ; 1) (T   t))
+ (s  1) ytLt exp ( A (L; 0; 1; 0) (T   t)) ;
Et
24 TZ
t
d

R
1 Ra
1
R
v (yv)
 + yvsLv   yvLv
35
= Et
24 TZ
t

R
1 Ra
1
R
v (yv)
 ( A (; ; 1)) + (s  1) yvLv (L   r   L)

dv
35
=  A (; ; 1) R
1 Ra
1
R
t (yt)
G (t; T ; ; ; 1)
+ (L   r   L) (s  1) ytLtG (L; t; T ; 0; 1; 0) :
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Therefore, in the immediate retirement region R (t),
R
1 Ra
1
R
t (yt)
G (t; T ; ; ; 1;A) + (g   1) ytltG (l; t; T ; 0; 1; 0;A)
+
R
1 Ra
1
R
t (yt)
 exp ( A (; ; 1) (T   t))
+ (s  1) ytLt exp ( A (L; 0; 1; 0) (T   t))
 

R
1 Ra
1
R
t (yt)
 + ytsLt   ytLt

+A (; ; 1)
R
1 Ra
1
R
t (yt)
G (t; T ; ; ; 1;R)
  (L   r   L) (s  1) ytLtG (L; t; T ; 0; 1; 0;R)
= 0:
Divided by ytLt on both sides, we get
R
1 Ra
1
R
t (yt)
  1
R L 1t G (t; T ; ; ; 1;A) + (g   1) ltL 1t G (l; t; T ; 0; 1; 0;A)
+
R
1 Ra
1
R
t (yt)
  1
R L 1t exp ( A (; ; 1) (T   t))
+ (s  1) exp ( A (L; 0; 1; 0) (T   t))
 

R
1 Ra
1
R
t (yt)
  1
R L 1t + s  1

+A (; ; 1)
R
1 Ra
1
R
t (yt)
  1
R L 1t G (t; T ; ; ; 1;R)
  (L   r   L) (s  1)G (L; t; T ; 0; 1; 0;R)
= 0:
Let xt = a
1
R
t (yt)
  1
R L 1t , zt = ltL
 1
t . We have
xt = y
  1
RL 10 exp

  
R
+
1
R

r +
1
2
2

  L +
1
2
2L

t+


R
  L

Wt

;
zt = l0L
 1
0 exp

l  
1
2
2l   L +
1
2
2L

t+ (l   L)Wt

:
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For xt and zt,
x =  

R
+
1
R

r +
1
2
2

  L +
1
2
2L +
1
2
2x;
x =

R
  L;
z = l  
1
2
2l   L +
1
2
2L +
1
2
2z;
z = l   L:
zt is a transform of xt,
zt = z0

xt
x0

exp (t) ;
where  = z
x
,  = z   122z   
 
x   122x

. The liquidation boundary Bt satises the
following backward recursive equation
R
1 RBtG
B (t; T ; ; ; 1;A)
+ (g   1) l0L 10 y

R exp (t)Bt G
B (l; t; T ; 0; 1; 0;A)
+
R
1 RBt exp ( A (; ; 1) (T   t)) + (s  1) exp ( A (L; 0; 1; 0) (T   t))
 

R
1 RBt + s  1

+A (; ; 1)
R
1 RBtG
B (t; T ; ; ; 1;R)
  (L   r   L) (s  1)GB (L; t; T ; 0; 1; 0;R)
= 0:
In the early exercise premium representation, the instantaneous gain minus instanta-
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neous loss is,
  (avu (f v + glv; lv; v)  yvf v   yvlv)
 

R
1 Ra
1
R
v (yv)
 ( A (; ; 1)) + (s  1) yvLv (L   r   L)

=  

R
1 Ra
1
R
v (yv)
 + yvglv   yvlv

 

R
1 Ra
1
R
v (yv)
 ( A (; ; 1)) + (s  1) yvLv (L   r   L)

:
Let it be equal to 0,
R
1 Ra
1
R
v (yv)
 + yvglv   yvlv
+
R
1 Ra
1
R
v (yv)
 ( A (; ; 1)) + (s  1) yvLv (L   r   L)
= 0:
Divided by yvLv, we get
(g   1) zv + R
1 Rxv (1  A (; ; 1)) + (s  1) (L   r   L) = 0:
Since
zv = z0

xv
x0

exp (v) ;
we have
(g   1) z0

xv
x0

exp (v) +
R
1 Rxv (1  A (; ; 1))
+ (s  1) (L   r   L)
= 0:
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Thus the limiting condition for BT is
(g   1) z0

BT
x0

exp (T ) +
R
1 RBT (1  A (; ; 1))
+ (s  1) (L   r   L)
= 0: 
Proposition 25. The derivative of the boundary @Bt
@y
satises
R
1 R
@Bt
@y
GB (t; T ; ; ; 1;A)
+ (g   1) l0L 10 y

R exp (t)Bt G
B (l; t; T ; 0; 1; 0;A)
 
y 1

R
+ 
@Bt
@y
Bt
!
+
R
1 R
@Bt
@y
exp ( A (; ; 1) (T   t))  R
1 R
@Bt
@y
+A (; ; 1)
R
1 R
@Bt
@y
GB (t; T ; ; ; 1;R) + R
1 RBt
@
@y
GB (t; T ; ; ; 1;A)
+ (g   1) l0L 10 y

R exp (t)Bt
@
@y
GB (l; t; T ; 0; 1; 0;A)
+A (; ; 1)
R
1 RBt
@
@y
GB (t; T ; ; ; 1;R)
  (L   r   L) (s  1)
@
@y
GB (L; t; T ; 0; 1; 0;R)
= 0;
with boundary condition
@BT
@y
=
  
R
(g   1) l0L 10 y

R
 1BT exp (T )
R
1 R (1  A (; ; 1)) +  (g   1) l0L 10 y

RB 1T exp (T )
:
Proof. See appendix. 
We numerically implement our model. Figure 4.1 gives the optimal liquidation
boundary of the state variable xt and its derivative with respect to the multiplier when
the initial liquid wealth is 3 with parameter values in Table 4.1. As shown in Proposition
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Table 4.1: Parameter values.
Interest rate r 0:03
Volatility of the market return  0:2
Market price of risk  0:3
Expected growth rate of intermediate liability l 0:02
Volatility of growth rate of intermediate liability l 0:04
Initial value of intermediate liability l0 1
Maximal intermediate shortfall tolerated g 2
Expected growth rate of terminal liability L 0:02
Volatility of growth rate of terminal liability L 0:06
Initial value of terminal liability L 10
Maximal terminal shortfall tolerated s 0:5
Coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion R 4
Subjective discount rate  0
A3, when l  =R, L < =R and  r + L   L  0, the liquidation region is up-
connected. The fund is optimal to liquidate the moment that the state variable xt hits
the boundary. Later we will construct the optimal liquidation boundary for the liquid
wealth which is more practical, as the fund sponsor can observe the value of pension
asset and decide whether to liquidate by comparing with its boundary. The right hand
side in Figure 4.1 gives the derivative of the boundary with respect to the multiplier. As
will be seen in the derivations later, this derivative is needed for computing the optimal
liquid wealth and the optimal portfolio.
4.5 Optimal pension assets
We are ready to derive the closed form solution of the liquid wealth Xt.
Theorem 26. We have the following representations of wealth processes. Liquid wealth
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Figure 41: This gure shows the optimal liquidation boundary of the
state variable xt and its derivative with respect to the multiplier y. Initial
liquid wealth is 3.
Xt satises
Xt = 
 1
t Et
24 tZ
t
v (f

v + lv) dv + t

F 
t
+ Lt
35
= a
1
R
t y
  1
R 
  1
R
t G (t; T ; ; ; 1;A)  (g   1) ltG (l; t; T ; 0; 1; 0;A) (4.3)
+a
1
R
t y
  1
R 
  1
R
t exp ( A (; ; 1) (T   t))
  (s  1)Lt exp ( A (L; 0; 1; 0) (T   t))
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; ; 1) a
1
R
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  1
R 
  1
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; ; 1;R)
+ (L   r   L) (s  1)LtG (L; t; T ; 0; 1; 0;R)
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R
t y

  1
R
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@y
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; ; 1;A)  (g   1) ylt @
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G (l; t; T ; 0; 1; 0;A)
 A (; ; 1) R
1 Ra
1
R
t y

  1
R
t
@
@y
G (t; T ; ; ; 1;R)
+ (L   r   L) (s  1) yLt
@
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G (L; t; T ; 0; 1; 0;R) :
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Proof. We have
Jt
= sup
2S
Et
24 Z
0

R
1 Ra
1
R
v (yv)
 + yvglv   yvlv

dv
+
R
1 Ra
1
R
 (y )
 + ysL   yL

:
Denote
Lt  Jt  
24 tZ
0

R
1 Ra
1
R
v (yv)
 + yvglv   yvlv

dv
35 ;
thus
Lt
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2S
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Z
t

R
1 Ra
1
R
v (yv)
 + yvglv   yvlv

dv
+
R
1 Ra
1
R
 (y )
 + ysL   yL

= Et
24 tZ
t

R
1 Ra
1
R
v (yv)
 + yvglv   yvlv

dv
+
R
1 Ra
1
R
t

yt

+ yt sL

t
  ytLt
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;
where  t is the optimal stopping time. Liquid wealth Xt satises
tXt = Et
24 Z
t
v (f

v + lv) dv + t

F 
t
+ Lt
35 :
131
Plug in the values of f v and F

 ,
tXt
= Et
24 tZ
t

a
1
R
v y
  1
R v   vglv + vlv

dv + a
1
R
t
y 
1
R t   t sLt + tLt
35 :
Lt is a convex function of y and the derivative of Lt with respect to the multiplier y
satises
@Lt
@y
= Et
24 tZ
t

 a
1
R
v y
  1
R v + vglv   vlv
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1
R
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1
R 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
t
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tL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35
=  tXt:
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Use Early Exercise Premium representation to write Lt as the following
Lt
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24 tZ
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=
R
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Therefore,
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 A (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R
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@
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For numerical implementation of our model, we simulate 20 realizations per year from
year 0 to year 20, in total 400 data points. Figure 4.2 shows the simulation of the
stock market index, the terminal liability and the intermediate liability for a particular
trajectory of underlying Brownian motion with model parameters in Table 4.1. For
this particular trajectory, the stock market gradually decreases in the rst 4 years,
increases sharply between year 4 and 6, then slowly decreases until year 14, nally
between year 14 and year 20 experiences a tremendous boom. The terminal liability
and the intermediate liability are both assumed to be positively related to the stock
market, thus they display similar patterns. Figure 4.3 shows the trajectory of the state
variable xt with its optimal liquidation boundary (shown previously in Figure 4.1). The
volatility of the state variable xt is =R  L. The state variable is positively related to
the stock market as =R L is positive for parameter values in Table 4.1. The evolution
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Figure 42: This gure shows a trajectory of the stock market index, the
terminal liability and the intermediate liability from year 0 to year 20.
of the state variable xt follows a similar pattern as the stock market index. During the
rst sharp increase of xt between year 4 and 6, it moves closer to its optimal liquidation
boundary but its not su¢ ciently close to hit the boundary. The fund continues to
operate and experiences a gradual decline of the stock market until at about year 14,
then the state variable xt increases sharply with the stock market boom and crosses the
boundary at about year 19, i.e., the fund under this particular trajectory is optimal to
liquidate at year 19.
The next theorem gives the optimal liquidation boundary for the liquid wealth.
Immediate liquidation is optimal when the liquid wealth crosses this boundary.
Theorem 27. If R > 1 and  r + L   L  0, then liquidation is optimal when the
liquid wealth crosses its boundary, i.e.,
Xt  y
L
R L
1+L
0 exp (Lt) (Bt   s+ 1)BLt (4.4)
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Figure 43: This gure shows that the state variable crosses the optimal
liquidation boundary at about year 19.
where L =
L
x
, L = L   122L   L
 
x   122x

and Bt is the boundary for the state
variable xt.
Proof. The liquid wealth before liquidation is
Xt = 
 1
t Et
24 tZ
t
v (f

v + lv) dv + t

F t + Lt
35
where  t is the optimal liquidation time. Plug in the values of f

v and F

 ,
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The liquid wealth at liquidation is
Xt = F

t + Lt
=
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yt
at
  1
R
  sLt + Lt
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 
yt
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  1
R
L 1t   s+ 1
!
:
We now show that the boundary of the term Lt

yt
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R
L 1t   s+ 1

is exactly
the liquidation boundary of the liquid wealth. It su¢ ces to show that the liquid wealth
before liquidation is less than or equal to the value of Lt

yt
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  1
R
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
. This
is to show, at time t before retirement,
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:
Optimal value function is
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R
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:
Thus we have
R
1 RytXt;b +
1
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tZ
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35 = Lt;
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and
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1
R
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R
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1
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Since g  1, vglv   vlv  0. Since s  1, if  r + L   L  0, we have
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h
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  tLt   (tsLt   tLt)
i
= (s  1)Et
h
tL

t
  tLt
i
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The reason is that the su¢ cient condition for Et
h
tL

t
i
 sup
2S
Et [L ] = tLt is that
the integrand in the delayed exercise premium is nonpositive for any time between 0
and T , i.e.,  r + L   L  0. Now we have
Et
24 tZ
t
(vglv   vlv) dv + t sLt   tLt   (tsLt   tLt)
35  0:
For R > 1, we get Xt;b  Xt;a. To compute the form of the boundary of liquid wealth,
Xt;a = Lt
 
yt
at
  1
R
L 1t   s+ 1
!
= Lt (xt   s+ 1) :
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Lt is a transform of xt,
Lt = L0

xt
x0
L
exp (Lt) ;
where L =
L
x
, L = L   122L   L
 
x   122x

, x0 = y 
1
RL 10 and
x =  

R
+
1
R

r +
1
2
2

  L +
1
2
2L +
1
2
2x;
x =

R
  L:
Therefore the optimal liquidation boundary of the liquid wealth is
y
L
R L
1+L
0 exp (Lt) (Bt   s+ 1)BLt : 
Figure 4.4 shows the optimal liquidation boundary computed from formula (4:4) and
the optimal liquid wealth for the underlying Brownian motion. It shows that the liquid
wealth crosses its optimal retirement boundary at about age 19, the same time as the
state variable xt crosses Bt.
4.6 Optimal net cash ow
The optimal intermediate and terminal net cash ow f v and F

 are as follows,
f v =

yv
av
  1
R
  glv;
F  =

y
a
  1
R
  sL ;
where the multiplier y satises initial budget constraint, i.e., equation (4:3) at time 0.
The optimal net cash ows are derived from the rst order conditions to equate
marginal benets and marginal costs. f v and F

 are both decreasing with respect to
the state price density . When SPD is su¢ ciently high, net cash ow is negative and
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Figure 44: This gure shows that the liquid wealth crosses its optimal
liquidation boundary at about year 19.
its optimal to inject funds to the plan. When SPD is su¢ ciently low, net cash ow is
positive and its optimal to withdraw funds from the plan as dividends. Note that the
minimum of intermediate net cash ow f v is  glv, and the minimum of terminal net
cash ow F  is  sL . Therefore, the intermediate contribution is limited to threshold
glv and the terminal contribution is limited to threshold sL . This ensures that large
contributions to the fund in excess of the threshold which harm the normal business
operations are not allowed.
Intermediate net cash ow and terminal net cash ow are both increasing with respect
to the initial wealth. Since the initial wealth is a decreasing function of the multiplier y.
When initial wealth is higher, the multiplier y becomes smaller, which results in higher
intermediate net cash ow and terminal net cash ow.
Figure 4.5 shows the optimal intermediate and terminal net cash ow. The pension
fund with initial liquid wealth of 3 is severely underfunded for the parameters of the
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Figure 45: This gure shows the optimal intermediate and terminal net
cash ow from year 0 to the optimal liquidation date year 19.
intermediate and terminal liability in Table 4.1. As can be seen from Figure 4.5, for
this particular trajectory of underlying Brownian motion, both the intermediate net
cash ow and the terminal net cash ow are negative, requiring the fund sponsor to
inject contribution to the fund. The rst component

yv
av
  1
R
in the representation of
the optimal intermediate net cash ow is negatively related to the state price density,
thus is positively related to the stock market. The second component glv is positively
related to the intermediate liability, thus is positively related to the stock market. The
di¤erence between these two components slightly widens as time increases, which results
in the optimal intermediate contribution to gradually increase from 1:05 to 1:48 until
liquidation. The magnitude of the second component sL in the optimal terminal net
cash ow dominates the magnitude of the rst component

y
a
  1
R
, thus the evolution
of F  follows a similar pattern as  sL . The terminal contribution increases as the
stock market increases, and reaches about 5:2 at the optimal liquidation date.
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Next proposition compares the optimal net cash ow for the pension fund that has
the option to liquidate with the optimal net cash ow for the pension fund that has no
option to liquidate (operate until time T ).
Proposition 28. If x > E
hR T
0
v (f

v + lv) dv + T (F

T + LT )
i
, then for the same
initial liquid wealth, the optimal net cash ow for the pension fund that has the option to
liquidate is lower than the optimal net cash ow when the pension fund has no option to
liquidate. If x  E
hR T
0
v (f

v + lv) dv + T (F

T + LT )
i
, then for the same initial liquid
wealth, the optimal net cash ow for the pension fund that has the option to liquidate is
higher than or equal to the optimal net cash ow when the pension fund has no option
to liquidate.
Proof. We just need to compare the values of the multiplier y for the two problems.
If x > E
hR T
0
v (f

v + lv) dv + T (F

T + LT )
i
, then for the same initial liquid wealth, the
multiplier for the pension fund with the option to liquidate is higher than the multiplier
for the pension fund with no option to liquidate, therefore the optimal net cash ow for
the pension fund that has the option to liquidate is lower than the optimal net cash ow
when the pension fund has no option to liquidate. And vice versa. 
4.7 Optimal portfolio
Optimal portfolio t is derived in the next Theorem. t can be decomposed to three
parts t = 1t + 2t + 3t, where 1t is the mean-variance component, 2t is the hedge
against uctuations in intermediate liability and 3t is the hedge against uctuations
in terminal liability. When the intermediate liability process lt is deterministic, i.e.,
l = 0, the hedging demand 2t vanishes. When the terminal liability process Lt is
deterministic, i.e., L = 0, the hedging demand 3t vanishes.
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Theorem 29. The optimal portfolio t satises
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R
1 Ra
1
R
t y

  1
R
t
@
@y
G (t; T ; ; ; 1;R)
+L (L   r   L) (s  1) yLt
@
@y
G (L; t; T ; 0; 1; 0;R)
+


R
  L


h
a
1
R
t y
  1
R 
  1
R
t h1   (g   1) lth2 + A (; ; 1) a
1
R
t y
  1
R 
  1
R
t h3
+ (L   r   L) (s  1)Lth4  
R
1 Ra
1
R
t y

  1
R
t h5   (g   1) ylth6
 A (; ; 1) R
1 Ra
1
R
t y

  1
R
t h7 + (L   r   L) (s  1) yLth8

:
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t = 1t + 2t + 3t, where
1t =
1
R
 1

h
a
1
R
t y
  1
R 
  1
R
t G (t; T ; ; ; 1;A) + a
1
R
t y
  1
R 
  1
R
t exp ( A (; ; 1) (T   t))
+A (; ; 1) a
1
R
t y
  1
R 
  1
R
t G (t; T ; ; ; 1;R) 
R
1 Ra
1
R
t y

  1
R
t
@
@y
G (t; T ; ; ; 1;A)
 A (; ; 1) R
1 Ra
1
R
t y

  1
R
t
@
@y
G (t; T ; ; ; 1;R)
+a
1
R
t y
  1
R 
  1
R
t h1   (g   1) lth2 + A (; ; 1) a
1
R
t y
  1
R 
  1
R
t h3
+ (L   r   L) (s  1)Lth4  
R
1 Ra
1
R
t y

  1
R
t h5   (g   1) ylth6
 A (; ; 1) R
1 Ra
1
R
t y

  1
R
t h7 + (L   r   L) (s  1) yLth8

;
2t = 
 1l 

  (g   1) ltG (l; t; T ; 0; 1; 0;A)  (g   1) ylt @
@y
G (l; t; T ; 0; 1; 0;A)

;
3t = 
 1L
f  (s  1)Lt exp ( A (L; 0; 1; 0) (T   t))
+ (L   r   L) (s  1)LtG (L; t; T ; 0; 1; 0;R)
+ (L   r   L) (s  1) yLt
@
@y
G (L; t; T ; 0; 1; 0;R)
 
h
a
1
R
t y
  1
R 
  1
R
t h1   (g   1) lth2 + A (; ; 1) a
1
R
t y
  1
R 
  1
R
t h3
+ (L   r   L) (s  1)Lth4  
R
1 Ra
1
R
t y

  1
R
t h5   (g   1) ylth6
 A (; ; 1) R
1 Ra
1
R
t y

  1
R
t h7 + (L   r   L) (s  1) yLth8

;
and
h1 =  
TZ
t
exp ( A (; ; 1) (v   t))n ( d (xt; Bv; v;C (; 1))) 1
x
p
v   tdv;
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h2 =  
TZ
t
exp ( A (l; 0; 1; 0) (v   t))n ( d (l;xt; Bv; v;C (l; 1; 0))) 1
x
p
v   tdv;
h3 =
TZ
t
exp ( A (; ; 1) (v   t))n (d (xt; Bv; v;C (; 1))) 1
x
p
v   tdv;
h4 =
TZ
t
exp ( A (L; 0; 1; 0) (v   t))n (d (L;xt; Bv; v;C (L; 1; 0))) 1
x
p
v   tdv;
h5 =  
TZ
t
d (xt; Bv; v;C (; 1)) exp ( A (; ; 1) (v   t))
n ( d (xt; Bv; v;C (; 1))) 1
2x (v   t)
 
@Bv
@y
Bv
 
@xt
@y
xt
!
dv;
h6 =  
TZ
t
d (l;xt; Bv; v;C (l; 1; 0)) exp ( A (l; 0; 1; 0) (v   t))
n ( d (l;xt; Bv; v;C (l; 1; 0))) 1
2x (v   t)
 
@Bv
@y
Bv
 
@xt
@y
xt
!
dv;
h7 =  
TZ
t
d (xt; Bv; v;C (; 1)) exp ( A (; ; 1) (v   t))
n (d (xt; Bv; v;C (; 1)))
1
2x (v   t)
 
@xt
@y
xt
 
@Bv
@y
Bv
!
dv;
h8 =  
TZ
t
d (L;xt; Bv; v;C (L; 1; 0)) exp ( A (L; 0; 1; 0) (v   t))
n (d (L;xt; Bv; v;C (L; 1; 0)))
1
2x (v   t)
 
@xt
@y
xt
 
@Bv
@y
Bv
!
dv:
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Proof. Apply Clark-Ocone formula to the representation of Xt in equation (4.3). 
Figure 4.6 shows the optimal equity holdings and cash holdings. For this particular
trajectory, we observe that the fund is long the market all the time and initially borrows
cash to invest in equity. Equity holdings reach the maximum at about year 6 when the
stock market reaches a local peak. Then the equity holdings begin to decrease and the
cash holdings increase. Figure 4.7 shows the components of the optimal portfolio. The
mean variance component dominates the hedges against uctuations in intermediate
liability and in terminal liability, thus the pattern of the mean variance component is
very similar to that of the equity holdings in Figure 4.6. The mean variance component
reaches its maximum at about year 6, when the stock market reaches a local peak.
We observe that the mean variance component is positive while the liability hedges are
negative or near 0. The magnitude of the liability hedges follows similar patterns as the
magnitude of the liabilities in Figure 4.2 at the beginning when the equity holdings are
high. When equity holdings begin to decrease, the magnitude of both liability hedges
decreases. At the optimal liquidation date, equity holdings, cash holdings and terminal
contribution are used to pay the terminal liability.
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Figure 46: This gure shows the amounts of optimal equity holdings
and cash holdings before liquidation.
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Figure 47: This gure shows the portfolio components.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
In this dissertation, we have developed a model of optimal consumption, labor and
portfolio choice with endogenous retirement for an individuals life-cycle decisions. Exact
solutions of the optimal policies are derived both for an individual with power utility
and for an individual with log utility in terms of an optimal retirement boundary. We
have also developed a model of optimal dividend-contribution, portfolio and liquidation
from the viewpoint of a dened benet pension fund and the optimal policies depends
on an optimal liquidation boundary. In our model the preference is in CRRA class, and
the utility is intertemporally additive and independent. An extension of our model is to
consider the model with more general preference structures, for example preference that
exhibits habit formation. In the life-cycle model, we have assumed that the market is
complete and the human capital of an individual can be monetized upfront. It would be
interesting to investigate the solutions of the case where the individual faces borrowing
constraints thus cannot have negative liquid wealth.
148
Chapter 6
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Before the retirement, the evolution of the liquid wealth Xv is
dXv = (rXv   cv + wv   wvlv) dv + v (dv + dWv) :
State price density v satises
dv =  v (rdv + dWv) :
Thus,
d (vXv) = vdXv +Xvdv + d [;X]v
= v (rXv   cv + wv   wvlv) dv + vv (dv + dWv)
 Xvv (rdv + dWv)  vvdv:
Simplifying,
d (vXv) + v (cv   wv + wvlv) dv = v (v  Xv) dWv:
Thus we have
tXt +
tZ
0
v (cv   wv + wvlv) dv = x+
tZ
0
v (v  Xv) dWv: (6.1)
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If (c; l; ) is admissible, then total wealth is nonnegative. The right hand side in
(6.1) is a local martingale and the left hand side is bounded below by a martingale
 Et
R 
0
vwvdv

, thus the right hand side is a supermartingale. Use optional stopping
theorem, for stopping time  2 S,
E
24X + Z
0
v (cv   wv + wvlv) dv
35  x:
After retirement, the evolution of the liquid wealth Xv is
dXv = (Xv   v) rdv   cvdv + v (dv + dWv)
= (rXv   cv) dv + v (dv + dWv) :
Thus,
d (vXv) + vcvdv = v (v  Xv) dWv:
Combine with the dynamics of tXv before retirement,
d (vXv) + v (cv   wv + wvlv) dv = v (v  Xv) dWv;
we get, for t >  ,
tXt +
Z
0
v (cv   wv + wvlv) dv +
tZ

vcvdv
= x+
Z
0
v (v  Xv) dWv +
tZ

v (v  Xv) dWv: (6.2)
The right hand side in (6:2) as a function of t is a local martingale and the left hand
side is bounded below by a martingale  Et
R 
0
vwvdv

, so the right hand side is a
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supermartingale. Use optional stopping theorem,
E
24TXT + Z
0
v (cv   wv + wvlv) dv +
TZ

vcvdv
35
 E
24X + Z
0
v (cv   wv + wvlv) dv
35
 x:
Thus we have the static constraint
E
24 Z
0
v (cv   wv + wvlv) dv +
TZ

vcvdv
35  x:
Next we show that if the static budget constraint (2:2) is satised, then 9 , such that
(c; l; ) is admissible. Before retirement, use martingale representation theorem,
Et
24 Z
0
v (cv   wv + wvlv) dv +
TZ

vcvdv
35
 E
24 Z
0
v (cv   wv + wvlv) dv +
TZ

vcvdv
35
=
tZ
0
vdWv, for some v, E
24 TZ
0
2vdv
35 <1, a.s.
Choose v, so that v (v  Xv) = v. Because
d (vXv) + v (cv   wv + wvlv) dv = v (v  Xv) dWv;
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we have
tXt +
tZ
0
v (cv   wv + wvlv) dv
= x+
tZ
0
v (v  Xv) dWv
= x+ Et
24 Z
0
v (cv   wv + wvlv) dv +
TZ

vcvdv
35
 E
24 Z
0
v (cv   wv + wvlv) dv +
TZ

vcvdv
35
 Et
24 Z
0
v (cv   wv + wvlv) dv +
TZ

vcvdv
35 :
Thus
tXt  Et
24 Z
t
v (cv   wv + wvlv) dv +
TZ

vcvdv
35 ;
or
tXt + Et
24 Z
t
vwv
35  Et
24 Z
t
v (cv + wvlv) dv +
TZ

vcvdv
35  0;
i.e., total wealth before retirement is nonnegative. After retirement, use martingale
representation theorem,
Et
24 Z
0
v (cv   wv + wvlv) dv +
TZ

vcvdv
35
 E
24 Z
0
v (cv   wv + wvlv) dv +
TZ

vcvdv
35
=
tZ
0
vdWv, for some v, E
24 TZ
0
2vdv
35 <1, a.s.
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Choose v both before retirement and after retirement, so that v (v  Xv) = v.
Because before retirement,
d (vXv) + v (cv   wv + wvlv) dv = v (v  Xv) dWv;
and after retirement
d (vXv) + vcvdv = v (v  Xv) dWv;
we have
tXt +
Z
0
v (cv   wv + wvlv) dv +
tZ

vcvdv
= x+
Z
0
v (v  Xv) dWv +
tZ

v (v  Xv) dWv
= x+ Et
24 Z
0
v (cv   wv + wvlv) dv +
TZ

vcvdv
35
 E
24 Z
0
v (cv   wv + wvlv) dv +
TZ

vcvdv
35
 Et
24 Z
0
v (cv   wv + wvlv) dv +
TZ

vcvdv
35 :
Thus,
tXt  Et
24 TZ
t
vcvdv
35  0;
i.e. the total wealth after retirement (the liquid wealth) is nonnegative. 
In Chapter 1, for xt = a
1
R
t (yt)
  1
R w
(1 ) 1
t , we show that the retirement region is
up connected for the state variable xt.
Proposition A1. If R > 1 and w  =R, then the retirement region is up connected
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for the state variable xt, i.e., if (xt; t) is in the retirement region, then (xt; t) is also
in the retirement region, 8  1.
Proof of Proposition A1: At time t, when xt changes to xt, since both t and wt
depend on the same Brownian motion, we assume t changes to pt, wt changes to qwt.
Therefore,  = p 
1
R q(1 ) 1. If (xt; t) is in the retirement region, then  t = t,
Jt = Et

Dt

= Et [Dt]
=
tZ
0
R
1 Rfa
1
R
v (yv)
w(1 )v dv +
tZ
0
yvwvdv
+Et
24 TZ
t
R
1 R
1
Ra
1
R
v (yv)
 dv
35 ;
and
sup
2S
Et
24 Z
t
R
1 Rfa
1
R
v (yv)
w(1 )v dv +
Z
t
yvwvdv
+
TZ

R
1 R
1
Ra
1
R
v (yv)
 dv
35
= Et
24 TZ
t
R
1 R
1
Ra
1
R
v (yv)
 dv
35 :
Now for (xt; t), we have
Jt (xt) =
tZ
0
R
1 Rfa
1
R
v (yv)
w(1 )v dv +
tZ
0
yvwvdv
+sup
2S
Et
24 Z
t
pq(1 )
R
1 Rfa
1
R
v (yv)
w(1 )v dv +
Z
t
pqyvwvdv
+
TZ

p
R
1 R
1
Ra
1
R
v (yv)
 dv
35 :
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We want to show that
sup
2S
Et
24 Z
t
pq(1 )
R
1 Rfa
1
R
v (yv)
w(1 )v dv +
Z
t
pqyvwvdv
+
TZ

p
R
1 R
1
Ra
1
R
v (yv)
 dv
35
=t
= pEt
24 TZ
t
R
1 R
1
Ra
1
R
v (yv)
 dv
35 ;
i.e., (xt; t) is also in the retirement region. We have
sup
2S
Et
24 Z
t
pq(1 )
R
1 Rfa
1
R
v (yv)
w(1 )v dv +
Z
t
pqyvwvdv
+
TZ

p
R
1 R
1
Ra
1
R
v (yv)
 dv
35
= psup
2S
Et
24 Z
t
q(1 )
R
1 Rfa
1
R
v (yv)
w(1 )v dv +
Z
t
p1 qyvwvdv
+
TZ

R
1 R
1
Ra
1
R
v (yv)
 dv
35
 psup
2S
Et
24 Z
t
R
1 Rfa
1
R
v (yv)
w(1 )v dv +
Z
t
yvwvdv
+
TZ

R
1 R
1
Ra
1
R
v (yv)
 dv
35
+psup
2S
Et
24 Z
t
 
q(1 )   1 R
1 Rfa
1
R
v (yv)
w(1 )v dv
+
Z
t
 
p1 q   1 yvwvdv
35
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= pEt
24 TZ
t
R
1 R
1
Ra
1
R
v (yv)
 dv
35
+psup
2S
Et
24 Z
t
 
q(1 )   1 R
1 Rfa
1
R
v (yv)
w(1 )v dv
+
Z
t
 
p1 q   1 yvwvdv
35 :
Su¢ cient condition for immediate retirement is
 
q(1 )   1 R
1 Rfa
1
R
v (yv)
w(1 )v  0;
and  
p1 q   1 yvwv  0
First we consider the case that R < 1, then we need q(1 )   1  0 and p1 q   1 
0. Therefore q  1, and p1 q  1. We have  = p  1R q(1 ) 1 = q(1 )p  1R q 1 =
q(1 ) (p1 q) 1, thus for the case that R < 1, whether  is higher than or lower than
1 is ambiguous. Now we consider the empirically relevant case that R > 1, then we
need q(1 )   1  0 and p1 q   1  0. Therefore q  1, and p1 q  1. We have
 = q(1 ) (p1 q) 1  1, i.e., the retirement region is up connected. The assumption
that p1 q  1 is equivalent to w  =R. q  1 indicates that the wage process is
positively related to the state variable xt. 
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Proof of Lemma 6: Calculate
a
1
R
t;v

t;vw
(1 )
t;v
= exp

  1
R
 (v   t)

exp

 

r +
1
2
2

(v   t)   (Wv  Wt)

 exp

(1  ) 

w  
1
2
2w

(v   t) + (1  ) w (Wv  Wt)

= exp

 


R
+ 

r +
1
2
2

  (1  ) 

w  
1
2
2w

(v   t)

 exp (  (   (1  )w) (Wv  Wt)) ;
then we have
Et
h
a
1
R
t;v

t;vw
(1 )
t;v
i
= Et

exp

 


R
+ 

r +
1
2
2

  (1  ) 

w  
1
2
2w

(v   t)

 exp (  (   (1  )w) (Wv  Wt))]
=
1Z
 1

exp

 


R
+ 

r +
1
2
2

  (1  ) 

w  
1
2
2w

(v   t)

 exp    (   (1  )w)pv   tz 1p
2
exp

 1
2
z2

dz
=
1Z
 1

exp

 


R
+ 

r +
1
2
2

  (1  ) 

w  
1
2
2w

(v   t)

 exp

1
2
2 (   (1  )w)2 (v   t)

 1p
2
exp

 1
2
 
z +  (   (1  )w)
p
v   t2 dz
=
1Z
 1
exp ( A (; ; ) (v   t)) 1p
2
exp

 1
2
 
z + C (; )
p
v   t2 dz
= exp ( A (; ; ) (v   t)) ;
and
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G (t; T ; ; ; ) = Et
24 TZ
t
a
1
R
t;v

t;vw
(1 )
t;v dv
35
=
TZ
t
exp ( A (; ; ) (v   t)) dv;
where
A (; ; ) =

R
+ 

r +
1
2
2

  (1  ) 

w  
1
2
2w

  1
2
C (; )2 ;
and
C (; ) =  (   (1  )w) :
Also,
Et
h
a
1
R
t;v

t;vw
(1 )
t;v 1R(v)
i
= Et
h
a
1
R
t;v

t;vw
(1 )
t;v
i
Et
24 a 1Rt;vt;vw(1 )t;v
Et
h
a
1
R
t;v

t;vw
(1 )
t;v
i1R(v)
35
= exp ( A (; ; ) (v   t))EC(;)t

1R(v)

;
where EC(;)t [] is the expectation under the measure
dQ
C(;)
0
dP
= exp

 1
2
C (; )2 v   C (; )Wv

:
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Under this measure, WC(;)v = Wv + C (; ) v is a Brownian Motion.
xv  Bv , xt exp

x  
1
2
2x

(v   t) + x (Wv  Wt)

 Bv
, 1p
v   t [(Wv  Wt) + C (; ) (v   t)]
 1
x
p
v   t

log

Bv
xt

 

x  
1
2
2x   xC (; )

(v   t)

, W
C(;)
v  WC(;)tp
v   t =
cW   d (xt; Bv; v;C (; )) ;
where cW is standard normal distribution under the new measure and
d (xt; Bv; v;C (; )) =
1
x
p
v   t

log

xt
Bv

+

x  
1
2
2x   xC (; )

(v   t)

:
Thus we have
E
C(;)
t

1R(v)

= 1 N ( d (xt; Bv; v;C (; ))) = N (d (xt; Bv; v;C (; ))) ;
Et
h
a
1
R
t;v

t;vw
(1 )
t;v 1R(v)
i
= exp ( A (; ; ) (v   t))N (d (xt; Bv; v;C (; ))) ;
G (t; T ; ; ; ;R) = Et
24 TZ
t
a
1
R
t;v

t;vw
(1 )
t;v 1R(v)dv
35
=
TZ
t
exp ( A (; ; ) (v   t))N (d (xt; Bv; v;C (; ))) dv;
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G (t; T ; ; ; ;A) = Et
24 TZ
t
a
1
R
t;v

t;vw
(1 )
t;v 1A(v)dv
35
=
TZ
t
exp ( A (; ; ) (v   t))N ( d (xt; Bv; v;C (; ))) dv;
@
@y
G (t; T ; ; ; ;R)
=
TZ
t
exp ( A (; ; ) (v   t)) @N (d (xt; Bv; v;C (; )))
@ (d (xt; Bv; v;C (; )))
@ (d (xt; Bv; v;C (; )))
@y
dv
=
TZ
t
exp ( A (; ; ) (v   t))n (d (xt; Bv; v;C (; )))
 1
x
p
v   t
 
@xt
@y
xt
 
@Bv
@y
Bv
!
dv;
and
@
@y
G (t; T ; ; ; ;A)
=
TZ
t
exp ( A (; ; ) (v   t)) @N ( d (xt; Bv; v;C (; )))
@ ( d (xt; Bv; v;C (; )))
@ ( d (xt; Bv; v;C (; )))
@y
dv
=
TZ
t
exp ( A (; ; ) (v   t))n ( d (xt; Bv; v;C (; )))
 1
x
p
v   t
 
@Bv
@y
Bv
 
@xt
@y
xt
!
dv: 
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Proof of Proposition 8: Recall that
G (t; T ; ; ; ;A) =
TZ
t
exp ( A (; ; ) (v   t))N ( d (xt; Bv; v;C (; ))) dv:
Denote
GB (t; T ; ; ; ;A) =
TZ
t
exp ( A (; ; ) (v   t))N ( d (Bt; Bv; v;C (; ))) dv;
i.e., substituting xt using Bt in G (t; T ; ; ; ;A). The boundary Bt satises
R
1 RfBtG
B (t; T ; ; ; ;A) +GB (t; T ; 0; 1; 0;A)
  R
1 R
1
R y 
1
R
(1 )w 1 ((1 ) 1)0 exp (t)B

t G
B (t; T ; ; ; 1;A)
= 0:
Take derivative with respect to y, we get
R
1 Rf
@Bt
@y
GB (t; T ; ; ; ;A) (6.3)
  R
1 R
1
R y 
1
R
(1 )w 1 ((1 ) 1)0 exp (t)B

t
GB (t; T ; ; ; 1;A)
 
y 1

  1
R
(1  )

+ 
@Bt
@y
Bt
!
+
R
1 RfBt
@
@y
GB (t; T ; ; ; ;A) + @
@y
GB (t; T ; 0; 1; 0;A)
  R
1 R
1
R y 
1
R
(1 )w 1 ((1 ) 1)0 exp (t)B

t
@
@y
GB (t; T ; ; ; 1;A)
= 0:
To derive the boundary condition of @BT
@y
, use the limiting condition for boundary BT ,
fBT    1R z0

BT
x0

exp (T ) = 1  1
R
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or
fBT    1R y  1R (1 )w 1 ((1 ) 1)0 exp (T )BT = 1 
1
R
:
Take derivative with respect to y, we get
f
@BT
@y
   1R

  1
R
(1  )

y 
1
R
(1 ) 1w 1 ((1 ) 1)0 exp (T )B

T
  1R y  1R (1 )w 1 ((1 ) 1)0 exp (T ) B 1T
@BT
@y
= 0:
@BT
@y
can be solved as a function of BT ,
@BT
@y
=

1
R
   1
R
(1  ) y  1R (1 ) 1w 1 ((1 ) 1)0 exp (T )BT
f    1R y  1R (1 )w 1 ((1 ) 1)0 exp (T ) B 1T
: 
In Chapter 2, let xt =

yt
at
 1
w 1t . The next proposition shows that the retirement
region for state variable xt is up connected.
Proposition A2. For   1

, if (xt; t) is in the retirement region, then (xt; t) is also
in the retirement region, 8  1.
Proof of Proposition A2: At time t, when xt changes to xt, since both t and wt
depend on the same Brownian motion, we assume t changes to pt, wt changes to qwt.
Therefore,  = p 1q 1. If (xt; t) is in the retirement region, then  t = t,
Jt = Et

Dt

= Et [Dt]
=
tZ
0
 av

1

ln

yv
av

+
1  

ln (wv)  1  

ln

1  


+
1


dv
+y
tZ
0
vwvdv + Et
24 TZ
t
av

  ln

yv
av

+ ln ()  1

dv
35 ;
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and
sup
2S
Et
24 Z
t
 av

1

ln

yv
av

+
1  

ln (wv)  1  

ln

1  


+
1


dv
+y
Z
t
vwvdv +
TZ

av

  ln

yv
av

+ ln ()  1

dv
35
= Et
24 TZ
t
av

  ln

yv
av

+ ln ()  1

dv
35 :
Now for (xt; t), we have
Jt (xt)
=
tZ
0
 av

1

ln

yv
av

+
1  

ln (wv)  1  

ln

1  


+
1


dv
+y
tZ
0
vwvdv
+sup
2S
Et
24 Z
t
 av

1

ln

ypv
av

+
1  

ln (qwv)  1  

ln

1  


+
1


dv
+y
Z
t
pvqwvdv +
TZ

av

  ln

ypv
av

+ ln ()  1

dv
35 :
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We want to show that
sup
2S
Et
24 Z
t
 av

1

ln

ypv
av

+
1  

ln (qwv)  1  

ln

1  


+
1


dv
+y
Z
t
pvqwvdv +
TZ

av

  ln

ypv
av

+ ln ()  1

dv
35
=t
= Et
24 TZ
t
av

  ln

ypv
av

+ ln ()  1

dv
35
= Et
24 TZ
t
av

  ln

yv
av

+ ln ()  1

dv +
TZ
t
av (  ln (p))
35 ;
i.e., (xt; t) is also in the retirement region.
sup
2S
Et
24 Z
t
 av

1

ln

ypv
av

+
1  

ln (qwv)  1  

ln

1  


+
1


dv
+y
Z
t
pvqwvdv +
TZ

av

  ln

ypv
av

+ ln ()  1

dv
35
= sup
2S
Et
24 Z
t
 av

1

ln

yv
av

+
1  

ln (wv)  1  

ln

1  


+
1


dv
+y
Z
t
vwvdv +
TZ

av

  ln

yv
av

+ ln ()  1

dv
+
Z
t
 av

1

ln (p) +
1  

ln (q)

dv + (pq   1) y
Z
t
vwvdv
+
TZ

av (  ln (p)) dv
35
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 sup
2S
Et
24 Z
t
 av

1

ln

yv
av

+
1  

ln (wv)  1  

ln

1  


+
1


dv
+y
Z
t
vwvdv +
TZ

av

  ln

yv
av

+ ln ()  1

dv
35
+sup
2S
Et
24 Z
t
 av

1

ln (p) +
1  

ln (q)

dv + (pq   1) y
Z
t
vwvdv
+
TZ

av (  ln (p)) dv
35
= Et
24 TZ
t
av

  ln

yv
av

+ ln ()  1

dv
35
+sup
2S
24Et Z
t
 av

1

ln (p) +
1  

ln (q)

dv + (pq   1) y
Z
t
vwvdv
+
TZ

av (  ln (p)) dv
35
= Et
24 TZ
t
av

  ln

yv
av

+ ln ()  1

dv +
TZ
t
av (  ln (p))
35
+sup
2S
Et
24 Z
t
 av

1

ln (p) +
1  

ln (q)

dv + (pq   1) y
Z
t
vwvdv
 
Z
t
av (  ln (p)) dv
35 :
Now we analyze the term
sup
2S
Et
24 Z
t
 av

1

ln (p) +
1  

ln (q)

dv + (pq   1) y
Z
t
vwvdv
 
Z
t
av (  ln (p)) dv
35 :
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We consider the su¢ cient conditions for immediate retirement. The term above is the
sum of three parts, the second part is stochastic, while the rst and the third are both
deterministic. We consider them separately. Because for the term (pq   1) y R 
t
vwvdv,
yvwv is positive, in order to immediately retire, we need pq  1, thus we have  =
p 1q 1  1. Because t changes to pt, wt changes to qwt, we have p  1 and q  1 if
we assume  is greater than w, which is empirically reasonable. If p  1 and q  1,
we have av (  ln (p))  0 and  av

1

ln (p) + 1 

ln (q)

=  av

(ln (pq)   ln (q))  0.
Both the terms in the rst and third integral are deterministic and therefore we can
compare them. Immediately retire if  av

1

ln (p) + 1 

ln (q)

  av (  ln (p))  0 for
all v, i.e. (  1) ln (p)  (1  ) ln (q). Su¢ cient condition to satisfy (  1) ln (p) 
(1  ) ln (q) is   1, i.e.   1

. 
Proof of Lemma 14: Use the denitions
C (; ) =  (   (1  )w) ;
A (; ; ) =

R
+ 

r +
1
2
2

  (1  ) 

w  
1
2
2w

  1
2
C (; )2 ;
we have
C (1; 0) =    w;
A (0; 1; 0) = r +
1
2
2  

w  
1
2
2w

  1
2
(   w)2 :
xv  Bv , xt exp

x  
1
2
2x

(v   t) + x (Wv  Wt)

 Bv
, 1p
v   t [(Wv  Wt)] 
1
x
p
v   t

log

Bv
xt

 

x  
1
2
2x

(v   t)

, W   d (xt; Bv; v; 0) ;
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where W is standard normal distribution and
d (xt; Bv; v;C (; )) =
1
x
p
v   t

log

xt
Bv

+

x  
1
2
2x   xC (; )

(v   t)

:
It follows that
P (t; T ; ;R) =
TZ
t
at;vEt

1R(v)

dv =
TZ
t
at;vN (d (xt; Bv; v; 0)) dv;
P (t; T ; ;A) =
TZ
t
at;vEt

1A(v)

dv =
TZ
t
at;vN ( d (xt; Bv; v; 0)) dv;
@
@y
P (t; T ; ;R) =
TZ
t
at;vn (d (xt; Bv; v; 0))
1
x
p
v   t
 
@xt
@y
xt
 
@Bv
@y
Bv
!
dv:
@
@y
P (t; T ; ;A) =
TZ
t
at;vn ( d (xt; Bv; v; 0)) 1
x
p
v   t
 
@Bv
@y
Bv
 
@xt
@y
xt
!
dv;
We have,
E

W1R(v)

=
1Z
 d(xt;Bv ;v;0)
zn (z) dz
=  
1Z
 d(xt;Bv ;v;0)
n0 (z) dz = n ( d (xt; Bv; v; 0)) ;
E

W1A(v)

=
 d(xt;Bv ;v;0)Z
 1
zn (z) dz
=  
 d(xt;Bv ;v;0)Z
 1
n0 (z) dz =  n ( d (xt; Bv; v; 0)) ;
167
thus
F1 (t; T ; ;R)
= Et
24 TZ
t
at;v ln

t;v
at;v

1R(v)dv
35
= Et
24 TZ
t
at;v

   r   1
2
2

(v   t)  Wpv   t

1R(v)dv
35
=

   r   1
2
2
 TZ
t
at;v (v   t)E

1R(v)

dv   
TZ
t
at;v
p
v   tE W1R(v) dv
=

   r   1
2
2
 TZ
t
at;v (v   t)N (d (xt; Bv; v; 0)) dv
 
TZ
t
at;v
p
v   tn ( d (xt; Bv; v; 0)) dv;
F1 (t; T ; ;A)
= Et
24 TZ
t
at;v ln

t;v
at;v

1A(v)dv
35
= Et
24 TZ
t
at;v

   r   1
2
2

(v   t)  Wpv   t

1A(v)dv
35
=

   r   1
2
2
 TZ
t
at;v (v   t)E

1A(v)

dv   
TZ
t
at;v
p
v   tE W1A(v) dv
=

   r   1
2
2
 TZ
t
at;v (v   t)N ( d (xt; Bv; v; 0)) dv
+
TZ
t
at;v
p
v   tn ( d (xt; Bv; v; 0)) dv;
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@
@y
F1 (t; T ; ;R)
=

   r   1
2
2


TZ
t
at;v
p
v   tn (d (xt; Bv; v; 0)) 1
x
 
@xt
@y
xt
 
@Bv
@y
Bv
!
dv
 
TZ
t
at;vn ( d (xt; Bv; v; 0)) d (xt; Bv; v; 0) 1
x
 
@Bv
@y
Bv
 
@xt
@y
xt
!
dv;
@
@y
F1 (t; T ; ;A)
=

   r   1
2
2


TZ
t
at;v
p
v   tn ( d (xt; Bv; v; 0)) 1
x
 
@Bv
@y
Bv
 
@xt
@y
xt
!
dv
+
TZ
t
at;vn ( d (xt; Bv; v; 0)) d (xt; Bv; v; 0) 1
x
 
@Bv
@y
Bv
 
@xt
@y
xt
!
dv;
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F2 (t; T ; ;R)
= Et
24 TZ
t
at;v ln (wt;v) 1R(v)dv
35
= Et
24 TZ
t
at;v

w  
1
2
2w

(v   t) + wW
p
v   t

1R(v)dv
35
=

w  
1
2
2w
 TZ
t
at;v (v   t)E

1R(v)

dv + w
TZ
t
at;v
p
v   tE W1R(v) dv
=

w  
1
2
2w
 TZ
t
at;v (v   t)N (d (xt; Bv; v; 0)) dv
+w
TZ
t
at;v
p
v   tn ( d (xt; Bv; v; 0)) dv;
F2 (t; T ; ;A)
= Et
24 TZ
t
at;v ln (wt;v) 1A(v)dv
35
= Et
24 TZ
t
at;v

w  
1
2
2w

(v   t) + wW
p
v   t

1A(v)dv
35
=

w  
1
2
2w
 TZ
t
at;v (v   t)E

1A(v)

dv + w
TZ
t
at;v
p
v   tE W1A(v) dv
=

w  
1
2
2w
 TZ
t
at;v (v   t)N ( d (xt; Bv; v; 0)) dv
 w
TZ
t
at;v
p
v   tn ( d (xt; Bv; v; 0)) dv;
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@
@y
F2 (t; T ; ;R)
=

w  
1
2
2w


TZ
t
at;v
p
v   tn (d (xt; Bv; v; 0)) 1
x
 
@xt
@y
xt
 
@Bv
@y
Bv
!
dv
+w
TZ
t
at;vn ( d (xt; Bv; v; 0)) d (xt; Bv; v; 0) 1
x
 
@Bv
@y
Bv
 
@xt
@y
xt
!
dv:
@
@y
F2 (t; T ; ;A)
=

w  
1
2
2w


TZ
t
at;v
p
v   tn ( d (xt; Bv; v; 0)) 1
x
 
@Bv
@y
Bv
 
@xt
@y
xt
!
dv
 w
TZ
t
at;vn ( d (xt; Bv; v; 0)) d (xt; Bv; v; 0) 1
x
 
@Bv
@y
Bv
 
@xt
@y
xt
!
dv: 
Proof of Proposition 16: To derive the equation satised by @Bt
@y
, take derivative
with respect to y in equation (3.2). To derive the boundary condition for @BT
@y
, use the
limiting condition
BT

(  1) ln

w0

BT
x0

exp (T )

 

1

  

ln (BT ) +K

= 1;
or
BT

(  1) ln  yw1+0 BT exp (T )  1   

ln (BT ) +K

= 1;
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Take derivative with respect to y,
@BT
@y

(  1) ln  yw1+0 BT exp (T )  1   

ln (BT ) +K

+BT

(  1)  1
BT
@BT
@y
+ (  1)  1
y
 

1

  

1
BT
@BT
@y

= 0:
@BT
@y
can be solved as a function of BT ,
@BT
@y
=
 BT (  1)  1y
(  1) ln  yw1+0 BT exp (T )   1    ln (BT ) +K + (  1)     1    : 
Proof of Lemma 20: The evolution of liquid wealth Xv is
dXv = (rXv   cv) dv + v (dv + dWv) ;
state price density v satises
dv =  v (rdv + dWv) :
Thus,
d (vXv) = vdXv +Xvdv + d [;X]v
= v (rXv   cv) dv + vv (dv + dWv)
 Xvv (rdv + dWv)  vvdv:
Simplifying,
d (vXv) + vcvdv = v (v  Xv) dWv:
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Thus we have
tXt +
tZ
0
vcvdv = x+
tZ
0
v (v  Xv) dWv:
If (f; F; ) is admissible, then liquid wealth is nonnegative. The right hand side is a
local martingale and the left hand side is bounded below, thus the right hand side is a
supermartingale. Use optional stopping theorem, for stopping time  2 S,
E
24X + Z
0
vcvdv
35  x;
or
E
24 Z
0
v (fv + lv) dv +  (F + L )
35  x:
Next we show that if the static budget constraint (4:1) is satised, then 9 , such that
(f; F; ) is admissible. Use martingale representation theorem,
Et
24 Z
0
vcvdv + X
35  E
24 Z
0
vcvdv + X
35
=
tZ
0
vdWv, for some v, E
24 TZ
0
2vdv
35 <1, a.s.
Choose v, so that v (v  Xv) = v. Because
d (vXv) + vcvdv = v (v  Xv) dWv;
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we have
tXt +
tZ
0
vcvdv
= x+
tZ
0
v (v  Xv) dWv
= x+ Et
24 Z
0
vcvdv + X
35  E
24 Z
0
vcvdv + X
35
 Et
24 Z
0
vcvdv + X
35 :
Thus
tXt  Et
24 Z
t
vcvdv + X
35 ;
and
Xt  0;
i.e., liquid wealth is nonnegative. 
In Chapte 3, dene the state variable xt = a
1
R
t (yt)
  1
R L 1t . The next proposition
gives the su¢ cient conditions for the liquidation region to be up connected or down
connected for xt.
Proposition A3. If l  =R, L < =R and  r+L L  0, then the liquidation
region is up connected. If l  =R, L > =R and  r + L   L  0, then the
liquidation region is down connected.
Proof of Proposition A3: At time t, when xt changes to xt, we assume t changes
to ot, Lt changes to pLt and lt changes to qlt. Therefore,  = o
  1
Rp 1. If (xt; t) is in
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the liquidation region, then  t = t,
Jt = Et

Dt

= Et [Dt]
=
tZ
0

R
1 Ra
1
R
v (yv)
 + yvglv   yvlv

dv
+
R
1 Ra
1
R
t (yt)
 + ytsLt   ytLt;
and
sup
2S
Et
24 Z
t

R
1 Ra
1
R
v (yv)
 + yvglv   yvlv

dv
+
R
1 Ra
1
R
 (y )
 + ysL   yL

=
R
1 Ra
1
R
t (yt)
 + ytsLt   ytLt:
Now for (xt; t), we have
Jt (xt)
=
tZ
0

R
1 Ra
1
R
v (yv)
 + yvglv   yvlv

dv
+sup
2S
Et
24 Z
t

o
R
1 Ra
1
R
v (yv)
 + oqyvglv   oqyvlv

dv
+o
R
1 Ra
1
R
 (y )
 + opysL   opyL

:
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We want to show that
sup
2S
Et
24 Z
t

o
R
1 Ra
1
R
v (yv)
 + oqyvglv   oqyvlv

dv
+o
R
1 Ra
1
R
 (y )
 + opysL   opyL

=t
= o
R
1 Ra
1
R
t (yt)
 + opytsLt   opytLt;
i.e., (xt; t) is also in the liquidation region. We have
sup
2S
Et
24 Z
t

o
R
1 Ra
1
R
v (yv)
 + oqyvglv   oqyvlv

dv
+o
R
1 Ra
1
R
 (y )
 + opysL   opyL

= osup
2S
Et
24 Z
t

R
1 Ra
1
R
v (yv)
 + o1 qyvglv   o1 qyvlv

dv
+
R
1 Ra
1
R
 (y )
 + o1 pysL   o1 pyL

 osup
2S
Et
24 Z
t

R
1 Ra
1
R
v (yv)
 + yvglv   yvlv

dv
+
R
1 Ra
1
R
 (y )
 + ysL   yL

+osup
2S
Et
24 Z
t
 
o1 q   1 (yvglv   yvlv) dv
+
 
o1 p  1 (ysL   yL )
= o

R
1 Ra
1
R
t (yt)
 + ytsLt   ytLt

+osup
2S
Et
24 Z
t
 
o1 q   1 (yvglv   yvlv) dv
+
 
o1 p  1 (ysL   yL ) :
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Su¢ cient conditions for immediate liquidation are (o1 q   1) (yvglv   yvlv)  0 and
that sup
2S
Et [(o
1 p  1) (ysL   yL )] obtains the supremum when  = t. We have
g  1 and s  1, because we assume intermediate contributions to the fund can be a
multiple of the intermediate liability, but terminal contribution is limited to a fraction
of the terminal liability. Since g  1, for (o1 q   1) (yvglv   yvlv) to be nonpositive,
its su¢ cient to require o1 q  1, which is equivalent to l  =R if p  1, q  1
and o  1. For sup
2S
Et [(o
1 p  1) (ysL   yL )] to immediately exercise, su¢ cient
condition is that the integrand in the delayed exercise premium is nonpositive for any
time between 0 and T , i.e.,
 
o1 p  1 (s  1) ( r + L   L)  0:
Since s  1, We need (o1 p  1)  0 and  r + L   L  0, or (o1 p  1)  0 and
 r + L   L  0. In order for  = o 
1
Rp 1 > 1, we need (o1 p  1) < 0, which is
equivalent to L < =R. In order for  = o 
1
Rp 1 < 1, we need (o1 p  1) > 0, which
is equivalent to L > =R. 
Proof of Proposition 25: To derive the derivative of the boundary @Bt
@y
, take derivative
of equation (4.2) with respect to the multiplier y. To derive the boundary condition of
@BT
@y
, use the limiting condition for boundary BT ,
(g   1) z0

BT
x0

exp (T ) +
R
1 RBT (1  A (; ; 1))
+ (s  1) (L   r   L)
= 0;
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or
(g   1) l0L 10 y

RBT exp (T ) +
R
1 RBT (1  A (; ; 1))
+ (s  1) (L   r   L)
= 0:
Take derivative with respect to y,

R
(g   1) l0L 10 y

R
 1BT exp (T ) +  (g   1) l0L 10 y

RB 1T exp (T )
@BT
@y
+
R
1 R
@BT
@y
(1  A (; ; 1))
= 0:
@BT
@y
can be solved as a function of BT ,
@BT
@y
=
  
R
(g   1) l0L 10 y

R
 1BT exp (T )
R
1 R (1  A (; ; 1)) +  (g   1) l0L 10 y

RB 1T exp (T )
: 
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